Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization

Abstract

This article examines the conditional effect that repression has on non-violent vs. violent mass mobilization. While governments often resort to violence to deter future mobilization, studies of the repression–dissent nexus have produced divergent evidence with regard to the effect of repression. Many argue that repression tends to backfire, while others demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing mobilization. I argue that the effect of repression varies by differing opposition tactics. I test two competing propositions regarding the effect of repression using event data from the Non-violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 3.0) from 1990 to 2012. The results show that repression, specifically physical repression, of non-violent opposition reduces participation size. Non-physical repression, on the other hand, has less of a deterrence effect on non-violent dissident mobilization.

Pas koji laje ne grize

“…S jedne strane, uslijed ovakvog vremenskog raspona mjerenja varijabli nije opravdano govoriti o stavovima o političkom nasilju kao uzrocima sudjelovanja u političkom nasilju, što bi pružilo vrijedan doprinos u razvoju instrumentarija za ranu detekciju rizičnih pojedinaca. S druge strane, poznato je da sudjelovanje u kolektivnom djelovanju (Pop-Eleches, Robertson i Rosenfeld, 2022), izloženost kolektivnom djelovanju (Landmann i Rohmann, 2020), kao i odgovor političkog sustava na kolektivno djelovanje (Chiang, 2021) mijenjaju percepciju kolektivnog djelovanja, što indirektno može utjecati i na motivaciju za ponavljanje istog. Iz navedenog proizlazi da je ranije sudjelovanje u političkom nasilju moglo izmijeniti stavove sudionika i o samom političkom nasilju.…”

Arming for conflict, arming for peace? How small arms imports affect intrastate conflict risk

“…Assessments of small arms’ effects on conflict outbreaks usually focus on illicit trade and privately owned weapons (e.g. Ayuba and Okafor, 2015; Banerjee and Muggah, 2002; Chivers, 2011; Stohl and Myerscough, 2007). They mostly conclude that the availability of small arms facilitates violent uprisings of non-state actors and is thus conducive to insurgency and conflict risk.…”