Violence, Insurgency, and the End of Empires

Abstract

There are three macro-level actors typically identified in the connection between contested decolonization, escalating levels of violence, and shrinking civilian spaces: the imperial authorities that resisted pressure to withdraw, settler populations wedded to white minority rule, and the anti-colonial nationalist groups determined to impose social control. This chapter discusses how reductive explanations of this type begin to unravel as soon as the forms of violence practised are explored. It is not that political struggles between imperialists and their opponents were irrelevant to violence and the ends of empire, but instead to indicate that violence in the late colonial world was rarely as binary as fighting “for” or “against” empire. There are multiple reasons for this violence, most being directly related to social standing, but remote from any unifying decolonization narrative. The most proximate of all was holding civilian status—a category whose juridical fragility was matched by its spatial insecurity.

The Howard League and liberal colonial penality in mid‐20th‐century Britain: The death penalty in Palestine and the Kenya Emergency

“…The statement explained in Palestine ‘the active rebel and the peaceful citizen are inextricably mixed’ and that ‘[v]irtually every village in the country has at one time or another harboured and supported the rebels and assisted in concealing their identity’. It adhered to the logic of colonial counter‐insurgency that civilians’ connection to regime opponents justified collective violence (see Thomas, 2018). The statement denied that ‘wholesale demolition’ of Palestinians’ houses was taking place but acknowledged that demolition was ‘occasionally’ used as collective punishment, which was justified as ‘fully recognised and understood by the Palestinian Arab’.…”

“…The statement denied that 'wholesale demolition' of Palestinians' houses was taking place but acknowledged that demolition was 'occasionally' used as collective punishment, which was justified as 'fully recognised and understood by the Palestinian Arab'. This highlights another aspect of colonial counter-insurgency (and colonial penality more widely), the racial coding of violence (Thomas, 2018). The statement outlined three types of collective punishment in use: collective fines, collective demolition and curfews.…”

“…Other measures included collective punishments such as cordon and search operations, curfews, forcible population resettlement (villagisation), limitation of populations’ access to food and free fire zones (French, 2011). Thomas (2018) defines dirty war as ‘highly demonstrative acts of collective violence that are designed to compel popular compliance, with other, more covert actions’ (p.505). The civilian population is the primary target.…”

“…Colonialism and counter‐insurgency during the era of decolonisation relied on violence and militarism. Dirty wars entailed ‘highly demonstrative acts of collective violence that [were] designed to compel popular compliance’ and which primarily targeted civilian populations (Thomas, 2018, p.505).…”

“…Emergency statutes ‘feature broad criminalization of political and military resistance, prosecution of civilians by military courts, summary proceedings, and harsh punishments’ (Ben‐Natan, 2021, p.742). Emergency powers remove restrictions on military action without the need for martial law (Thomas, 2018). Ben‐Natan argues that colonial authorities do not acknowledge that penal emergency regimes are part of the penal system.…”