Verifying a delegation protocol for grid systems

Aziz, Benjamin; Hamilton, Geoff W.

doi:10.1016/j.future.2010.12.003

Cited by 3 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…From our analysis in [4], we were able to show that |DT chain | > 1 in the case of four agents or more participating in the protocol. Since delegation is a form of trust, this vulnerability breaks the trust chain and does not preserve the deterministic delegation chain property of Section 2.…”

Section: Non-deterministic Delegation Chainsmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…In [4], we carried out a verification of the DToken protocol using static analysis techniques based on abstract interpretation. The analysis revealed several vulnerabilities in the protocol, which we summarise in the following sections.…”

Section: Vulnerabilities Of the Current Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we provide an overview of the results of a formal analysis that applied to the DToken protocol in [4] and that uncovered serious vulnerabilities in the protocol related to the above properties. We furthermore propose a second corrected version of the protocol, DToken II, which we claim fixes the vulnerabilities of the original version by changing slightly the specification of the protocol to allow agreement on the session identity number between the delegator and the delegatee, prevent the immature passing of permissions from the delegator to the delegatee and finally, use ordered lists instead of sets to pass information about delegation chains.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Correcting a Delegation Protocol for Grids

Aziz

2011

Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business

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Delegation is one important aspect of large-scale distributed systems where many processes and operations run on behalf of system users and clients in order to achieve highly computational and resource intensive tasks. As such, delegation is often synonymous with the concept of trust, in that the delegator would expect some degree of reliability regarding the delegatee's ability and predictability to perform the delegated task. The delegation protocol itself is expected to maintain certain basic properties, such as integrity, traceability, accountability and the ability to determine delegation chains. In this paper, we give an overview of the vulnerabilities that one such delegation protocol exhibits, namely DToken, a lightweight protocol for Grid systems, as interesting examples of design mistakes. We also propose an alternative protocol, DToken II, which fixes such vulnerabilities.

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Section: Non-deterministic Delegation Chainsmentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: Vulnerabilities Of the Current Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Correcting a Delegation Protocol for Grids

Aziz

2011

Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business

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“…To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. protocol [6,8,17,24,25,7,4,27,5]. However, by its very nature, formal verification is an expensive process and requires a high level of expertise.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other examples included [3,5]. In [5], the application of formal analysis was applied to another protocol in the project for achieving delegation of trust between users and resources. The analysis uncovered various flaws in the original protocol.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application of formal analysis to enhancing trust in a complex grid-based operating system

Aziz

2012

Proceedings of the 3rd International ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Architecting Critical Systems

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This paper presents a case study in the application of formal modelling and verification techniques to a large-scale distributed operating system for Grids called XtreemOS. The process algebraic language of applied π-calculus is used to model one of the mutual authentication protocols in the XtreemOS trust model, and an associated tool called ProVerif is used to verify the data leakage and mutual authentication properties in the protocol. The results, beside enhancing the level of assurance of the protocol in a critical part of the system, contribute to better understanding of the level of detail in the protocol's specification hence enabling better implementation of the protocol.

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