Varieties of Inference?

Malmgren, Anna‐Sara

doi:10.1111/phis.12123

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Let me end by briefly considering Malmgren's (2018) account of the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states. On her view, what explains the normative difference is a difference in functional accessibility, rather than phenomenal accessibility.…”

Section: Anna‐sara Malmgrenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren

Smithies

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Section: Anna‐sara Malmgrenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren

Smithies

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…In order to avoid biasing the discussion toward the liberal or conservative view of inference, it is important to specify some conditions that the most basic kind of inferential reasoning must meet. Then one can explore how other conditions must be met for such reasoning to count as clearly epistemically justificatory, rather than merely “inference-like.” Although it is difficult to provide a neutral perspective on inference, most authors agree that an inference is a psychological process that provides an epistemically important outcome because of its cognitive structure (e.g., Siegel, 2017; Malmgren, 2018). There is also consensus about how this epistemic outcome must depend on a cognitively controlled psychological action that arrives at a conclusion in response to the content of the premises of the inference, which serve as reasons for the conclusion.…”

Section: Defining Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This approach is in line with conservatism because it denies the status of “inference” to reasoning that is inferentially structured, but unavailable for scrutiny and person-level evaluation. Yet, it grants that inferentially integrated but inaccessible states can play a kind of justificatory role, only one that is non-rational or available to personal level scrutiny (Malmgren, 2018).…”

Section: Accuracy Constraints: the Agency-first Account Of Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is because authors have divergent views about the nature of propositional content, the probabilistic or logical relations underlying inferential and conceptual reasoning, and also about the definition of “belief” required for inferential reasoning. Good inferences are sources of justification, but perhaps not all types of inferential reasoning are fully rational (Malmgren, 2018). The scope of the kind of inference discussed in this paper concerns epistemically normative justification.…”

Section: Attention: High- and Low-level Inferential Cognition In Varimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Inferential Integrity and Attention

Montemayor

2019

Front. Psychol.

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How should we define inferential reasoning in high-level cognition? Can non-conscious representations guide or even determine high-level cognition? If so, what are the properties of such non-conscious representations? Two contemporary debates on high-level cognition center on these issues. The first concerns the possibility of cognitive penetration, or the degree and extent to which high-level cognition influences or determines low-level cognition. The second focuses on the epistemic status of conscious cognition, and on whether or not non-conscious cognition could play a similar, albeit not as fundamental, justificatory role as conscious cognition. This latter issue is at the heart of the question concerning the epistemic status of conscious awareness. This paper focuses on the epistemic standard required for inference, or inferential reasoning, to count as justificatory. The debates on the epistemic status of consciousness and cognitive penetration typically assume such a standard because high-level cognition is associated with rationality, inferentially structured thought, and the epistemic responsibility one has for the conclusions drawn through one’s inferences. The paper proposes an account of inferential-attention that explains how cognitive penetration of non-phenomenally conscious cognition and perception is possible, and why there are unconscious processes that should be considered as essential components of high-level cognition. Sections “Defining Inference” and “Accuracy Constraints: The Agency-First Account of Inference” provide a theoretical framework for understanding the multiple criteria that an adequate account of inference and rational thought must satisfy. Sections “Attention: High- and Low-Level Inferential Cognition in Various Domains” and “Advantages Concerning Rule-Following and Rationality: Not Necessarily-Phenomenal Inferential Reasoning” articulate the inferential-attention account and explain how it meets the descriptive and normative criteria for epistemic responsibility and rationality. In particular, section “Attention: High- and Low-Level Inferential Cognition in Various Domains” defends an agential interpretation of inferential-attention, which offers a resolution of the tension between conservative or consciousness-based approaches to inference and liberal approaches that allow for types of unconscious or subdoxastic processes. An agency condition on inference explains how inference is a psychological process under the control of the agent, and at the same time, it satisfies the normative condition that an inference should be responsive to reasons or evidence by being cognitively available for personal level assessment and evaluation. The key is to identify this kind of epistemic agency with attention. Section “Advantages Concerning Rule-Following and Rationality: Not Necessarily-Phenomenal Inferential Reasoning” compares this inferential-attention account with an influential agential account of inference based on conscious intuition, and it argues that the former account is prefe...

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“…In Malmgren (, §5), I used ‘direct revisability’. But it's not ideal to use ‘revision’ for both the formation and subsequent alteration of attitudes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On fundamental responsibility

Malmgren

2019

Philosophical Issues

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Some psychological states-paradigmatically, beliefs and intentions-are rationally evaluable: they can be rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. Other states-e.g. sensations and gastrointestinal states-aren't: they're a-rational. On a familiar but hard-to-make-precise line of thought, at least part of what explains this difference is that we're somehow responsible for (having/being in) states of the former sort, in a way we're not for the others. But this responsibility can't be modeled on the responsibility we have for our (free, intentional) actions. So how should it be understood? In this paper I address that question. The overall shape of my answer is in line with tradition: I take the responsibility to be grounded in certain capacities for reflection and control. Answers in this family have recently been subjected to an interesting challenge. But the version I defend meets that challenge. 198MALMGREN 199 paradigmatic of states for which we aren't. I'm responsible, in this way, for believing that I'm over forty, for intending to stay out late, and (perhaps) for deciding to vote for a certain presidential candidate. But I'm not responsible in this way for being over forty, for having a headache the next morning, or for any of that candidate's ensuing political decisions or actions. At most I have derivative responsibility for some of their decisions or actions, and for my headache. I have none for my age.What makes something an object of fundamental responsibility? I address that question below. But first, in §2, I briefly elaborate on the link between responsibility and rational evaluability-in particular as regards mental states. In §3, I sketch my proposal, and rehearse a recent challenge aimed at all proposals of the same broad type as mine. In §4-8, I clarify and defend the proposal, show that it meets the challenge, and argue that it explains fundamental responsibility.

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Varieties of Inference?

Cited by 11 publications

References 72 publications

Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren

Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren

Inferential Integrity and Attention

On fundamental responsibility

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