Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections

Gans-Morse, Jordan; Mazzuca, Sebastián; Nichter, Simeon

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1664112

Cited by 58 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…58 This is consistent with what GansMorse et al call ''turnout buying,'' whereby ''clientelist parties'' use a range of strategies to activate their passive constituencies rather than induce vote switching. 59 In Kenya, Kramon also found empirical corroboration from survey data that votebuying had a significant effect on increasing turnout. 60 …”

Section: Journal Of Eastern African Studies 537mentioning

confidence: 83%

“…57 Contrary to the expectation that turnout would be lower in areas where the NRM has traditionally dominated (as it is typically more difficult to mobilize when victory appears assured), Museveni grew his share of the vote as participation levels increased, while a majority of voters stayed away from the polls in opposition strongholds such as Kampala. 58 This is consistent with what GansMorse et al call ''turnout buying,'' whereby ''clientelist parties'' use a range of strategies to activate their passive constituencies rather than induce vote switching.…”

Section: Journal Of Eastern African Studies 537mentioning

confidence: 95%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: the contribution of public opinion surveys

Torrenté¹

2013

Journal of Eastern African Studies

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Section: Journal Of Eastern African Studies 537mentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Journal Of Eastern African Studies 537mentioning

confidence: 95%

Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: the contribution of public opinion surveys

Torrenté¹

2013

Journal of Eastern African Studies

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“…In some cases, exit costs are prohibitive. When parties have programmatic linkages to voters (Kitschelt ), agents may still be relevant for mobilizing supporters (Gans‐Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter ; Nichter ), but efforts to swing voters could prove fruitless or too expensive for these agents. For example, in ethnically diverse societies, voters may suspect local ethnic leaders WHO are brokering votes for politicians of a different ethnic group (Baldwin ; Chandra ; Corstange ; Koter ), and agents can anticipate that changing parties would make them lose their grip with supporters, and relevance to parties.…”

Section: Brokers: An Unreliable Channel To Votersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

Novaes

2017

American J Political Sci

116

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). In such cases, parties can depend on community organizers, ethnic chiefs, local bureaucrats, neighborhood leaders, patrons, caciques, local politicians, and other notables to act as brokers and close the gulf between party politicians and voters.Brokers, however, can be disloyal, acting more as free agents in a market with a bloc of voters to "sell" than as committed activists. From the perspective of the party, these brokers are useful because they control a private constituency or a module of nonpartisan voters who can readily help party candidates win elections. However, when multiple parties need brokerage to win elections, only the one offering the most attractive incentive package will gain the support of a broker. Since parties' relative ability to hire brokers may fluctuate over time, ongoing brokerage deals may suddenly break apart as brokers receive counteroffers and decide to place their modules elsewhere. Hence, these modular parties need brokers to mobilize voters, but broker disloyalty makes them fragile.This article identifies how brokers' disloyalty affects the organization and the electoral performance of political parties through an empirical analysis of Brazil. The research design in this article takes advantage of the fact that Brazilian parties use local politicians, especially mayoral candidates, as agents for their congressional candidates, making the measurement of broker affiliation less elusive. In addition, the article employs an empirical strategy that counters the endogeneity problem that weak electoral support stimulates disloyalty, or in the case of mayoral candidates, party switching (Desposato 2006). In 2007, a Supreme Court decision greatly inhibited party switching. This decision by an independent actor increased exit costs for those brokers who had won mayoral elections and would then have to ponder whether party switching was worth losing the mayoral seat. Thus, the court increased the survival odds of some party-broker relations.

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“…Algunos autores definen al gasto en bienes privados o particularistas, particularmente al gasto en personal o empleo público, como patronazgo (patronage) Murillo, 2004;Melo;Pereira, 2013;Remmer, 2007;Robinson;Verdier, 2013;Van den Walle, 2007). Mientras que otros lo denominan como gasto clientelar (Carneiro, 2009;Gans-Morse;Mazzuca;Nichter, 2014;Kitschelt;Wilkinson, 2007;Magaloni;Díaz-Cayeros;Estevez, 2007;Stokes, 2007;Zarazaga, 2014) o compra de votos Stokes, 2004;Nichter, 2008), que es aquel que involucra el uso de recursos públicos (típicamente empleo públi-co) a cambio de apoyo electoral. Debido a la complejidad para observar los intercambios entre políticos entregando recursos públicos y votantes apoyándolos electoralmente, y para evitar las dificultades de medir clientelismo, una parte de la literatura ha tratado de definir y comparar el gasto del gobierno en distintos bienes y servicios (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, p. 569).…”

Section: Definicionesunclassified

COALICIONES ELECTORALES, ESTABILIDAD DEL GABINETE Y GASTO SOCIAL PROVINCIAL: los casos de Buenos Aires, Córdoba y San Luis (1993-2009)

González

Cáceres

2017

Cad. CRH

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Por que alguns governos gastam mais em bens públicos que outros? Por que o gasto social varia? Este trabalho explora alguns fatores-chave que explicam a variação no gasto social de províncias argentinas. Estudamos essas províncias porque elas têm grande autonomia na decisão sobre os montantes a serem definidos como gasto social e porque existe grande variação nesse montante. A partir de dados originais do orçamento das províncias argentinas entre 1993 e 2009 e utilizando estatísticas descritivas e análises de três casos-chave (as províncias de Buenos Aires, San Luís e Córdoba), mostramos que o gasto social cresce à medida que diminuem os custos da articulação da coalizão eleitoral e da coalizão de governo, bem como a alternância e a rotatividade de cargos-chave no governo. O artigo discute os resultados nas três províncias argentinas selecionadas e explora as implicações da discussão sobre os determinantes políticos do gasto social e o desenho de políticas sociais, especialmente em países em desenvolvimento e democracias federais.

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Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections

Cited by 58 publications

References 33 publications

Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: the contribution of public opinion surveys

Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: the contribution of public opinion surveys

Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

COALICIONES ELECTORALES, ESTABILIDAD DEL GABINETE Y GASTO SOCIAL PROVINCIAL: los casos de Buenos Aires, Córdoba y San Luis (1993-2009)

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