Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

Abstract

). In such cases, parties can depend on community organizers, ethnic chiefs, local bureaucrats, neighborhood leaders, patrons, caciques, local politicians, and other notables to act as brokers and close the gulf between party politicians and voters.Brokers, however, can be disloyal, acting more as free agents in a market with a bloc of voters to "sell" than as committed activists. From the perspective of the party, these brokers are useful because they control a private constituency or a module of nonpartisan voters who can readily help party candidates win elections. However, when multiple parties need brokerage to win elections, only the one offering the most attractive incentive package will gain the support of a broker. Since parties' relative ability to hire brokers may fluctuate over time, ongoing brokerage deals may suddenly break apart as brokers receive counteroffers and decide to place their modules elsewhere. Hence, these modular parties need brokers to mobilize voters, but broker disloyalty makes them fragile.This article identifies how brokers' disloyalty affects the organization and the electoral performance of political parties through an empirical analysis of Brazil. The research design in this article takes advantage of the fact that Brazilian parties use local politicians, especially mayoral candidates, as agents for their congressional candidates, making the measurement of broker affiliation less elusive. In addition, the article employs an empirical strategy that counters the endogeneity problem that weak electoral support stimulates disloyalty, or in the case of mayoral candidates, party switching (Desposato 2006). In 2007, a Supreme Court decision greatly inhibited party switching. This decision by an independent actor increased exit costs for those brokers who had won mayoral elections and would then have to ponder whether party switching was worth losing the mayoral seat. Thus, the court increased the survival odds of some party-broker relations.

To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

“…Mayoral candidates have extensive knowledge of their area and constituents, and continued interaction allows them to gather information from voters and gain their trust. In most cases, they recruit party members, including council candidates, municipal bureaucrats, and professional brokers, who devote part of their time to helping politicians in exchange for jobs, gifts, and favors (Krauss and Pekkanen 2011;Montero 2012;Novaes 2017). There are incentives for party elites at the local level to invest in party organization, as politicians make extensive use of the party organization in local elections (Van Dyck 2014;Samuels and Zucco 2015).…”

Horizontal But Not Vertical: Accountability Institutions and Electoral Sanctioning in Northeast Brazil

“…Directly elected mayors are the most important local political actors because they control the local municipal apparatus and also function as important intermediaries between citizens and the state and federal governments. Political competition is largely non-ideological, and parties tend to be weak (Novaes 2017), especially in smaller municipalities. While many voters may have persistent loyalties to political families or other groups within the municipality (discussed further below), swing voters tend to vote on more personalistic or clientelistic grounds.…”

Transformation or Substitution? The Workers’ Party and the Right in Northeast Brazil

“…The judiciary branch attempted to curtail party-switching in 2007 by determining that elected positions belong to the party rather than the individual, but the decision was revoked for executives in 2015 (Novaes 2018). 6…”

“…Brazilian municipalities, one of the few in the world recognized as independent members of the union, received significant responsibilities following redemocratization, including the power to draft social policy (notably on primary health and basic education), the freedom to deter-mine property and sales taxes, and substantial leeway in deciding how to target spending. Continued interaction and local knowledge allow mayors to develop steady relationships with voters, making them powerful brokers who can control access to local voters for their parties, coalitions, or even the highest bidder (Avelino, Biderman, and Baroni 2012;Novaes 2018). Collectively, mayors are essential for the consolidation of political power in a state and are therefore an important part of state elites' and national elites' electoral calculus.…”

“…The party also contested 35 percent fewer municipal elections as many incumbent mayors had abandoned ship. Although such opportunistic behavior is commonplace in Brazil (Desposato 2006;Novaes 2018), the scholarly consensus was that 1 Thanks go to Frances Hagopian, Peter Johannessen, Eduardo Moncada, Timothy Power, Celina Souza, Kurt Weyland, and three anonymous reviewers. Extra special thanks to Wendy Hunter.…”