Our system is currently under heavy load due to increased usage. We're actively working on upgrades to improve performance. Thank you for your patience.
1998
DOI: 10.1080/09636419808429353
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Variations on a theme: The conceptualization of deterrence in Israeli strategic thinking

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
10
0

Year Published

2001
2001
2010
2010

Publication Types

Select...
4
2
2

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 35 publications
(10 citation statements)
references
References 27 publications
0
10
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Finally, despite the skepticism with regard to the feasibility of deterring these actors, one must still acknowledge that in most cases both terrorists and ethnic groups—albeit to different extents—are attached to territory and to state(s). This implies that we should differentiate among distinct kinds of actors 61 ; and further, since statehood and territory increase the chances of achieving successful deterrence (for example, Bar‐Joseph 1998:180), this differentiation may have important implications with regard to the prospects of deterring them and their willingness to be socialized into these practices.…”
Section: Combining the “New” Threats Trend With The Interpretative Trendmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Finally, despite the skepticism with regard to the feasibility of deterring these actors, one must still acknowledge that in most cases both terrorists and ethnic groups—albeit to different extents—are attached to territory and to state(s). This implies that we should differentiate among distinct kinds of actors 61 ; and further, since statehood and territory increase the chances of achieving successful deterrence (for example, Bar‐Joseph 1998:180), this differentiation may have important implications with regard to the prospects of deterring them and their willingness to be socialized into these practices.…”
Section: Combining the “New” Threats Trend With The Interpretative Trendmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Kaufmann (2001:458) suggests that one of the advantages of separation is that it strengthens an actor’s ability to successfully implement deterrence. In such situations, he claims, “the conflict changes from one of mutual pre‐emptive ethnic cleansing to something approaching conventional interstate war in which normal deterrence dynamics apply.” Similarly, deterrence scholars have provided some insights that may contribute to the study of deterrence in ethnic conflict (for example, Bar‐Joseph 1998:180; regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict). This, of course, is not necessarily a problem in these specific studies; however, it demonstrates the need to further elaborate on the implementation of this concept.…”
Section: Deterrence and Rogue Statesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Od střetu s Fatahem v roce 2007 Hamás sám účinně kontroluje pásmo Gazy. 2 Second Stage of Operation Cast Lead Begins [online]. 3 Viz například COHEN, Stuart, The Futility of Operation Cast Lead; KATZ, Yaakov, The operation is over but the war continues; WALT, Stephen, The myth of Israel's strategic genius.…”
Section: Závěrmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The study also asks this question but in a more profound and structured manner. In order to do so it sees the operation and a few preceding and following months through the lens of four different conceptions of deterrence which can be found in Israeli security thinking (and were laid out by Uri Bar-Joseph in 1998). More specifically, the study tries to answer these questions: Which strategy of deterrence had Israel used before operation Cast Lead?…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Strong states appear generally more capable of deterring new challenges (Mearsheimer 1983;Shimshoni 1988;Lieberman 1994Lieberman , 1995Huth 1988Huth , 1996Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997). Strength, however, cannot always prevent lowlevel "probes" through which challenging states evaluate their opponents" resolve (George and Smoke 1974;Lieberman 1994Lieberman ,1995Shimshoni 1988;Bar-Joseph 1998;Morris 1993;Huth, Bennett and Gelpi 1992;Huth and Russett 1993). Similarly, reputations for resolve on the part of the threatening state contribute to deterrence success only conditionally.…”
Section: Power Through Coercive Meansmentioning
confidence: 99%