While methodologists have provided us ample notice of both the problem of non-proportional hazards and the means of correcting for them, less attention has been paid to the post-estimation interpretation. The suggested inclusion of time interactions in our models is more than a statistical fix: these corrections alter the substantive meaning and interpretation of results. Framing the issue as a specific case of multiplicativeinteraction modeling, I provide detailed discussion of the problem of non-proportional hazards and present several appropriate means of interpreting both the substantive impact and the significance of variables whose effects may change over time.

Donors are more likely to send aid to leaders facing elevated risks of losing power, but targets’ ability to benefit from this assistance is conditioned by regime type and political processes. The institutionalization of winning coalitions’ loyalty across regime type follows opposite patterns, supporting opposite temporal dynamics across regime types. Democratic leaders’ coalitions are firmest immediately after taking office, and aid is of most assistance to them at that time. As competition and dissatisfaction grow, aid becomes a political liability. In small winning coalition systems, however, coalitions become more solid over time, facilitating increasing benefits from aid. Without a firm coalition, however, external resources are destabilizing to autocratic leaders. Analysis of 4,692 leader years from 1960 to 2001 using a censored probit model supports these expectations.

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The mechanical stimuli generated as a finger interrogates the physical and chemical features of an object forms the basis of fine touch. Haptic devices, which are used to control touch,...

Resources for foreign aid come under attack when parties that care little for international affairs come to power. Internationally focused parties of the left and right, however, prefer to use aid as a tool to pursue their foreign policy goals. Yet varying goals based on left-right ideology differentiate the way donors use foreign aid. We leverage sector aid to test hypotheses from our Partisan Theory of Aid Allocation and find support for the idea that domestic political preferences affect foreign aid behavior. Left-internationalist governments increase disaster aid, while parochial counterparts cut spending on budget assistance and aid that bolsters recipients' trade viability. Conservative governments favor trade-boosting aid. We find consistent, nuanced, evidence for our perspective from a series of Error Correction Models and extensive robustness checks. By connecting theories of foreign aid to domestic politics, our approach links prominent, but often disconnected, fields of political research and raises important questions for policymakers interested in furthering the efficacy of development aid.Keywords: foreign aid allocation, donor ideology, internationalism, sectoral aid, domestic politics, OECD donor states, party politics, multi-dimensional preferences Foreign aid offers a potent instrument to incentivize recipient leaders' behavior, but its effectiveness has long been questioned.1 For many scholars, aid's patchy record in promoting democratization, growth, and cooperation stems from moral hazard and geopolitics: donors' strategic incentives diverted aid flows from the neediest or most deserving states and damaged their credibility. Analysis focused on which donor-states fell into this trap (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004), and on aid's expanded utility after the Cold War (Bearce and Tirone 2010). New 1 For a typology of "returns" to donor states, see Dudley and Montmarquette (1976). Morgenthau's (1962) essay exemplifies aid-for-policy skepticism.1 research, however, seeks to explain variation in aid efforts within countries over time. These studies open up the democratic donor state, substituting the domestic political preferences of governments for the amorphous "national interest", but find mixed support thus far (e.g. Noël and Therién 1995;Fleck and Kilby 2010; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Schmaljohann 2014).Yet, foreign aid allocations likely reflect the goals of domestic decision-makers and consequently the preferences of key actors should influence foreign aid outputs (Tingley 2010, Milner and Tingley 2010, Fleck and Kilby 2010, Dreher, et al. 2014).We consider how partisan ideological preferences affect donors' allocation decisions across the array of foreign assistance sectors. We argue that parties' preferences predict their approach to foreign affairs. Changes in the preferences of governing parties produce shifts in allocation across aid types. Focusing on the effect of ideology on the most frequently used aid sectors allows detailed predictions that would be obscured by aggregate tren...