Variability of Individual Infectiousness Derived from Aggregate Statistics of COVID-19

Kirkegaard, Julius B.; Sneppen, Kim

doi:10.1101/2021.01.15.21249870

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…3 "Roughly 72 attendees". around 0.10 [32,33,48]. This indicates that for SARS-CoV-2, the 10% most infectious individuals are responsible for approximately 80% of the transmission.…”

Section: Does Sars-cov-2 Have a Weak Spot?mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…This transmission heterogeneity can be summarized by the overdispersion parameter k (a number that—for small values of k —approximates the fraction of people that are responsible for 80% of the transmissions) [42], with lower k denoting a more heterogeneous transmission—that is, one prone to superspreading events. For SARS‐CoV, this was estimated to be 0.16, corresponding to a high level of transmission heterogeneity, while estimates for SARS‐CoV‐2 have been even more dramatic—around 0.10 [32, 33, 48]. This indicates that for SARS‐CoV‐2, the 10% most infectious individuals are responsible for approximately 80% of the transmission.…”

Section: Does Sars‐cov‐2 Have a Weak Spot?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The COVID‐19 pandemic: key considerations for the epidemic and its control

Ørskov

Nielsen

Føns

et al. 2021

APMIS

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The response to the ongoing COVID‐19 pandemic has been characterized by draconian measures and far too many important unknowns, such as the true mortality risk, the role of children as transmitters and the development and duration of immunity in the population. More than a year into the pandemic much has been learned and insights into this novel type of pandemic and options for control are shaping up. Using a historical lens, we review what we know and still do not know about the ongoing COVID‐19 pandemic. A pandemic caused by a member of the coronavirus family is a new situation following more than a century of influenza A pandemics. However, recent pandemic threats such as outbreaks of the related and novel deadly coronavirus SARS in 2003 and of MERS since 2012 had put coronaviruses on WHOs blueprint list of priority diseases. Like pandemic influenza, SARS‐CoV‐2 is highly transmissible (R 0 ~2.5). Furthermore, it can fly under the radar due to a broad clinical spectrum where asymptomatic and pre‐symptomatic infected persons also transmit the virus – including children. COVID‐19 is far more deadly than seasonal influenza; initial data from China suggested a case fatality rate of 2.3% – which would have been on par with the deadly 1918 Spanish influenza. But, while the Spanish influenza killed young, otherwise healthy adults, it is the elderly who are at extreme risk of dying of COVID‐19. We review available seroepidemiological evidence of infection rates and compute infection fatality rates (IFR) for Denmark (0.5%), Spain (0.85%) and Iceland (0.3%). We also deduce that population age structure is key. SARS‐CoV‐2 is characterized by superspreading, so that ~10% of infected individuals yield 80% of new infections. This phenomenon turns out to be an Achilles heel of the virus that may explain our ability to effectively mitigate outbreaks so far. How will this pandemic come to an end? Herd immunity has not been achieved in Europe due to intense mitigation by non‐pharmaceutical interventions; for example, only ~8% of Danes were infected across the 1 st and 2 nd wave. Luckily, we now have several safe and effective vaccines. Global vaccine control of the pandemic depends in great measure on our ability to keep up with current and future immune escape variants of the virus. We should thus be prepared for a race between vaccine updates and mutations of the virus. A permanent reopening of society highly depends on winning that race.

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“…3 "Roughly 72 attendees". around 0.10 [32,33,48]. This indicates that for SARS-CoV-2, the 10% most infectious individuals are responsible for approximately 80% of the transmission.…”

Section: Does Sars-cov-2 Have a Weak Spot?mentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Does Sars‐cov‐2 Have a Weak Spot?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The COVID‐19 pandemic: key considerations for the epidemic and its control

Ørskov

Nielsen

Føns

et al. 2021

APMIS

Self Cite

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“…terventions O ne of the major features of the coronavirus pandemic has been overdispersion in transmission, manifesting itself as superspreading. There is evidence that around 10% of infected individuals are responsible for 80% of new cases (1)(2)(3)(4). This means that some individuals have a high personal reproductive number, while the majority hardly infect at all.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Lockdowns exert selection pressure on overdispersion of SARS-CoV-2 variants

Nielsen¹,

Eilersen²,

Simonsen

et al. 2021

Preprint

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The SARS-CoV-2 ancestral strain has caused pronounced superspreading events, reflecting a disease characterized by overdispersion, where about 10% of infected people causes 80% of infections. New variants of the disease have different person-to-person variations in viral load, suggesting for example that the Alpha (B.1.1.7) variant is more infectious but relatively less prone to superspreading. Meanwhile, mitigation of the pandemic has focused on limiting social contacts (lockdowns, regulations on gatherings) and decreasing transmission risk through mask wearing and social distancing. Using a mathematical model, we show that the competitive advantage of disease variants may heavily depend on the restrictions imposed. In particular, we find that lockdowns exert an evolutionary pressure which favours variants with lower levels of overdispersion. We find that overdispersion is an evolutionarily unstable trait, with a tendency for more homogeneously spreading variants to eventually dominate.

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Superspreading and heterogeneity in transmission of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19: A systematic review

Wang

Chen

Guo

et al. 2021

Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal

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Background Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have caused substantial public health burdens and global health threats. Understanding the superspreading potential of a virus is important for characterizing transmission patterns and informing strategic decision-making in disease control. This systematic review aimed to summarize the existing evidence on superspreading features and to compare the heterogeneity in transmission within and among various coronavirus epidemics of SARS, MERS and COVID-19. Methods PubMed, Medline, and Embase databases were extensively searched for original studies on the transmission heterogeneity of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 published in English between January 1, 2003, and February 10, 2021. After screening the articles, we extracted data pertaining to the estimated dispersion parameter ( k ) which has been a commonly-used measurement for transmission heterogeneity and superspreading potential. Findings We included a total of 60 estimates of transmission heterogeneity from 26 studies on outbreaks in 22 regions. The majority (90%) of the k estimates were small, with values less than 1, indicating an over-dispersed transmission pattern. The point estimates of k for SARS and MERS ranged from 0.12 to 0.20 and from 0.06 to 2.94, respectively. Among 45 estimates of individual-level transmission heterogeneity for COVID-19 from 17 articles, 91% were derived from Asian regions. The point estimates of k for COVID-19 ranged between 0.1 and 5.0. Conclusions We detected a substantial over-dispersed transmission pattern in all three coronaviruses, while the k estimates varied by differences in study design and public health capacity. Our findings suggested that even with a reduced R value, the epidemic still has a high resurgence potential due to transmission heterogeneity.

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Variability of Individual Infectiousness Derived from Aggregate Statistics of COVID-19

Cited by 7 publications

References 15 publications

The COVID‐19 pandemic: key considerations for the epidemic and its control

The COVID‐19 pandemic: key considerations for the epidemic and its control

Lockdowns exert selection pressure on overdispersion of SARS-CoV-2 variants

Superspreading and heterogeneity in transmission of SARS, MERS, and COVID-19: A systematic review

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