Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot

Pronin, Emily; Kugler, Matthew B.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011

Cited by 276 publications

(260 citation statements)

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“…The present results and this view of the actor-observer bias are consistent with research on the introspection illusion (18,34,35), which entails people's tendency to view their own motives, intentions, and desires as the key to understanding their actions (a tendency not shown in the case of others). People have rich introspective access to the conflicting desires, complex thoughts, and impinging circumstances that precede their actions (but not others' actions), and this may contribute to their heightened sense of freely choosing those actions.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

“…People have rich introspective access to the conflicting desires, complex thoughts, and impinging circumstances that precede their actions (but not others' actions), and this may contribute to their heightened sense of freely choosing those actions. This raises the possibility that hearing about others' mental wavering and mixed emotions will make others' actions seem more freely willed, although this possibility may be diminished by people's general lack of faith in the probative value of others' mental reports (18,34,35).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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People believe they have more free will than others

Pronin

Kugler²

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Four experiments identify a tendency for people to believe that their own lives are more guided by the tenets of free will than are the lives of their peers. These tenets involve the a priori unpredictability of personal action, the presence of multiple possible paths in a person's future, and the causal power of one's personal desires and intentions in guiding one's actions. In experiment 1, participants viewed their own pasts and futures as less predictable a priori than those of their peers. In experiments 2 and 3, participants thought there were more possible paths (whether good or bad) in their own futures than their peers' futures. In experiment 4, participants viewed their own future behavior, compared with that of their peers, as uniquely driven by intentions and desires (rather than personality, random features of the situation, or history). Implications for the classic actor-observer bias, for debates about free will, and for perceptions of personal responsibility are discussed.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

People believe they have more free will than others

Pronin

Kugler²

2010

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…We are biased toward that which comes fastest and most easily to mind, (availability or representative heuristic, Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), which is often thoughts about the self (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 2002;Kruger, 1999). We over-rely on our introspections, considering the more objective, behavioral facts as secondary (Pronin & Kugler, 2007). We are biased toward self-enhancement and justify our beliefs and actions-even altruistic action-in terms of self-interest, (Miller, 1999).…”

Section: §322 Accuracy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet, human beings are notoriously (and apparently naturally) disposed to over-estimate their capacity to know the truth and under-estimate their weaknesses (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996;Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995;Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kunda, 1990;Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007;Stanovich & West, 1997;Wegener & Petty, 1997). Indeed, the evidence is clear that there is a strong tendency even to under-estimate our liability to such biases (Pronin & Kugler, 2007)! Furthermore, we are susceptible to all sorts of biases that make knowing difficult.…”

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confidence: 99%

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Samuelson¹,

Church

2014

Philosophical Psychology

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In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions-agent-reliabilism and agentresponsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)-as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2 cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation. §1. IntroductionAny account of knowing has, as its starting point, the capacity and desire to know the "truth," through whatever normative criteria the "truth" can be established. Yet, human beings are notoriously (and apparently naturally) disposed to over-estimate their capacity to know the truth and under-estimate their weaknesses (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996;Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995;Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kunda, 1990;Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007;Stanovich & West, 1997;Wegener & Petty, 1997). Indeed, the evidence is clear that there is a strong tendency even to under-estimate our liability to such biases (Pronin & Kugler, 2007)! Furthermore, we are susceptible to all sorts of biases that make knowing difficult. For example, we tend to favor evidence or data received early in our inquiries (Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009) and we tend to discount the weight of evidence that counts against hypotheses we endorse (Nickerson, 1998). Second, evolutionary psychologists have offered some intriguing arguments that these dispositions are embedded within our cognitive architecture in ways that can systematically lead us to biased thinking, in some cases for adaptive reasons (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Our intention here is to apply some principles and distinctions from virtue epistemology to the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases to gain a better understanding of the promise and perils of our cognitive systems. We will examine questions of how and under what circumstances these heuristics and biases can be characterized as epistemic vices and how the specific epistemic virtue of intellectual humility may help mitigate these vi...

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“…However, psychology research from the last 40 years has produced a growing list of cognitive biases which impact our rationality. Even the sheer belief that one does not show as many biases as other people is a cognitive bias itself (Pronin & Kugler 2007). Most of the biases are usually harmless and do not affect mental health.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Leveraging Behavioral Economics in Mobile Application Design

Stockinger

Koelle

Lindemann

et al. 2014

Gamification in Education and Business

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People do not always think and behave rationally. Behavioral economics has produced theories to explain when and why people make such allegedly irrational decisions, for example if it comes to spending money. However, humans tend to use reference points to judge and decide. Nowadays, mobile devices can work as flexible tools to create reference points thus supporting decisions without being explicit about it. We discuss if and how mobile apps can influence decision making. As a consequence, apps can be built to better fit into the decision making progress. We argue that applying concepts from behavioral economics can increase user experience in a subtle manner.

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Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot

Cited by 276 publications

References 45 publications

People believe they have more free will than others

People believe they have more free will than others

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Towards Leveraging Behavioral Economics in Mobile Application Design

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