When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Abstract

In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions-agent-reliabilism and agentresponsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)-as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2 cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation. §1. IntroductionAny account of knowing has, as its starting point, the capacity and desire to know the "truth," through whatever normative criteria the "truth" can be established. Yet, human beings are notoriously (and apparently naturally) disposed to over-estimate their capacity to know the truth and under-estimate their weaknesses (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996;Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995;Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kunda, 1990;Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007;Stanovich & West, 1997;Wegener & Petty, 1997). Indeed, the evidence is clear that there is a strong tendency even to under-estimate our liability to such biases (Pronin & Kugler, 2007)! Furthermore, we are susceptible to all sorts of biases that make knowing difficult. For example, we tend to favor evidence or data received early in our inquiries (Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009) and we tend to discount the weight of evidence that counts against hypotheses we endorse (Nickerson, 1998). Second, evolutionary psychologists have offered some intriguing arguments that these dispositions are embedded within our cognitive architecture in ways that can systematically lead us to biased thinking, in some cases for adaptive reasons (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Our intention here is to apply some principles and distinctions from virtue epistemology to the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases to gain a better understanding of the promise and perils of our cognitive systems. We will examine questions of how and under what circumstances these heuristics and biases can be characterized as epistemic vices and how the specific epistemic virtue of intellectual humility may help mitigate these vi...

Development and validation of a multi-dimensional measure of intellectual humility

“…The original item pool consisted of 52 items (see S1 Table ). Items were informed by a thorough consideration of the defining aspects of intellectual humility, as well as some of its more penumbral elements, based on a thorough literature review of psychological and philosophical research on humility in general—Tangney [ 14 – 15 ]; Lee & Ashton [ 16 ]; Ashton & Lee [ 1 ]; Davis et al [ 17 ]—and intellectual humility specifically—Roberts & Wood [ 5 – 6 ]; Hazlett [ 4 ]; Samuelson & Church [ 7 ]; Zagzebski [ 18 ]; Whitcomb et al [ 8 ]; Christen, Robinson, & Alfano [ 10 ]—as summarized in the introduction. We aimed to include items that answered to at least one definition of intellectual humility, casting a wide net so as to include items even if one or more of the above definitions would rule them out.…”

“…For phase one, we collected conceptual definitions of the construct. No consensus emerges within philosophy or psychology on a precise definition of intellectual humility; primary contenders include Hazlett [ 4 ], Roberts and Wood [ 5 – 6 ], Samuelson and Church [ 7 ], Whitcomb et al [ 8 ], Samuelson et al [ 9 ], and Christen et al [ 10 ]. Hazlett [ 4 ] thinks that intellectual humility is the “disposition not to adopt epistemically improper higher order epistemic attitudes, and to adopt […] epistemically proper higher order epistemic attitudes.” This conception of intellectual humility is most pertinent in the realm of disagreement.…”

“…Samuelson and Church [ 7 ] characterize intellectual humility in the dual-process language popular in contemporary psychology. They claim that intellectual humility is “mostly found in the conscious exercise of Type 2 thinking and can come about […] through the proper collaboration of Type 1 and Type 2 processes […] or through the conscious practice of applying Type 2 thinking” [ 7 ].…”

“…Samuelson and Church [ 7 ] characterize intellectual humility in the dual-process language popular in contemporary psychology. They claim that intellectual humility is “mostly found in the conscious exercise of Type 2 thinking and can come about […] through the proper collaboration of Type 1 and Type 2 processes […] or through the conscious practice of applying Type 2 thinking” [ 7 ]. Thus, Samuelson and Church think that intellectual humility can be implemented as a motivating trait, but they are more inclined to construe it in the dual-process framework, where it harmonizes automatic processes (heuristics, affective intuitions, etc.)…”

Humility in personality and positive psychology

“…Since agency is characterized by pursuing personal goals and exhibiting skills and accomplishments (traits such as competence, intellectual goodness, or dominance); and communion is related to forming and maintaining social connections (traits such as warmth, morality, social goodness, or nurturance, Bruckmüller & Abele 2013), intellectual humility, with its epistemic and social dimensions might fall in with either dimension of the Big Two. The intellectual dimension, with its focus on the pursuit of truth, might align it more on the agentic side, while the social dimension, with its emphasis on the social skills required for collaborative pursuit of knowledge, might land it more on the communal side (Samuelson et al 2014).…”