V-Dem Codebook V8

Coppedge, Michael; Gerring, John; Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Lindberg, Staffan I.; Skaaning, Svend-Erik; Teorell, Jan; Altman, David; Bernhard, Michael; Cornell, Agnes; Fish, M. Steven; Gjerløw, Haakon; Glynn, Adam; Hicken, Allen; Krusell, Joshua; Lührmann, Anna; Marquardt, Kyle L.; McMann, Kelly M.; Mechkova, Valeriya; Olin, Moa; Paxton, Pamela; Pemstein, Daniel; Seim, Brigitte; Sigman, Rachel; Staton, Jeffrey K.; Sundström, Aksel; Tzelgov, Eitan; Uberti, Luca J.; Wang, Yiting; Wig, Tore; Ziblatt, Daniel

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3172791

Cited by 71 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 94 publications

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“…The significant complexity of weighing or including components and correlating observations year to year has lead some researchers to criticize the validity and broad application of these measures [10,29]. More recent attempts to resolve some of these issues or to create more consistent measures include the Bayesian Corruption Index [30], the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) indicator of political corruption [31], and the Quality of Government Institute's (QoG) European Quality of Government Index (EQI) [32]. The latter index is calculated at the regional level, enabling the study of corruption perceptions at the sub-national level.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How do these measures of corruption risk correlate with the survey-based perception indicators mentioned in the previous section? In Figure 2, we correlate the average single bidding rates from 2008-2016 with Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) [27], the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (WB CoC) [28], Varieties of Democracy's Corruption Index (V-Dem Corruption Index) [31], the Quality of Government (QoG) Institute's European Quality of Governance Index (European Qual. Gov.…”

Section: Corruption Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective

Wachs

Fazekas

Kertész³

2020

Int J Data Sci Anal

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We use methods from network science to analyze corruption risk in a large administrative dataset of over 4 million public procurement contracts from European Union member states covering the years 2008-2016. By mapping procurement markets as bipartite networks of issuers and winners of contracts we can visualize and describe the distribution of corruption risk. We study the structure of these networks in each member state, identify their cores and find that highly centralized markets tend to have higher corruption risk. In all EU countries we analyze, corruption risk is significantly clustered. However, these risks are sometimes more prevalent in the core and sometimes in the periphery of the market, depending on the country. This suggests that the same level of corruption risk may have entirely different distributions. Our framework is both diagnostic and prescriptive: it roots out where corruption is likely to be prevalent in different markets and suggests that different anti-corruption policies are needed in different countries.Address correspondence to: johannes.wachs@cssh.rwth-aachen.de. This article is based on a chapter of the doctoral dissertation of Johannes Wachs.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Corruption Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective

Wachs

Fazekas

Kertész³

2020

Int J Data Sci Anal

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“…In order to control for differences at the country-level, the models include also the annual percentage growth rate of GDP collected in the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2013). At the individual-level I include traditional sociodemographic controls for gender (dummy), age (in full years), education level (highest level attained), perception of income household (on a reversed four-point scale) 8 To assess the reliability of this latent variable I run a correlation test with an objective measure of accountability, the Vertical Accountability Index annually elaborated by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute (Coppedge et al 2018). The result confirms a strong and highly significant correlation (R = 0.670***) between the two measures.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘sanction-policy’ linkage from the perspective of citizens and the role of the party system

Fumarola

2020

Acta Polit

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Research on dynamic representation stresses the effect of electoral incentives on politicians' motivation to pursue policies in line with the preferences of the majority of the citizens. However, comparative research on the so-called sanction-policy link is still limited. The present article assesses the anticipatory effect of electoral accountability on government responsiveness from the perspective of citizens across 25 European countries. Results confirm the strong positive relationship between perceptions of electoral accountability and assessments of government responsiveness. Finally, the article examines the potential moderating effect of specific party system characteristics on people's attitudes. Using multilevel models to analyse survey data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, the study shows that the link between perceived accountability and responsiveness is conditional upon specific characteristics of the party system, namely fragmentation and volatility.

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“…We use the Varieties of Democracy (V‐Dem, v8) dataset to count the number of reiterated elections (Coppedge et al. , b). Our sampling procedure means that our categorisation of electoral authoritarian regimes is somewhat more expansive than some other studies (Levitsky & Way ; Schedler ) by the inclusion of the handful of remaining monarchies in the world.…”

Section: Measuring Reiterated Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We average over time to capture civil society capacity as a form of social capital that is acquired over time (Coppedge et al. : 47)…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival

Bernhard

Edgell

Lindberg

2019

European J Political Res

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Authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure in power. Yet, there is also evidence that multiparty competition makes electoral authoritarianism more vulnerable to failure. Proceeding from the assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian electoral openings are inherently uncertain, it is argued in this article that the institutionalisation of elections determines whether electoral authoritarianism promotes stability or vulnerability. By 'institutionalisation', it is meant the ability of authoritarian regimes to reduce uncertainty over outcomes as they regularly hold multiparty elections. Using discrete-time event-history models for competing risks, the effects of sequences of multiparty elections on patterns of regime survival and failure in 262 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are assessed, conditioned on their degree of competitiveness. The findings suggest that the institutionalisation of electoral uncertainty enhances authoritarian regime survival. However, for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes this entails substantial risk. The first three elections substantially increase the probability of democratisation, with the danger subsequently diminishing. This suggests that convoking multiparty competition is a risky game with potentially high rewards for autocrats who manage to institutionalise elections. Yet, only a small number of authoritarian regimes survive as competitive beyond the first few elections, suggesting that truly competitive authoritarianism is hard to institutionalise. The study thus finds that the question of whether elections are dangerous or stabilising for authoritarianism is dependent on differences between the ability of competitive and hegemonic forms of electoral authoritarianism to reduce electoral uncertainty.

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V-Dem Codebook V8

Cited by 71 publications

References 94 publications

Corruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective

Corruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective

The ‘sanction-policy’ linkage from the perspective of citizens and the role of the party system

Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival

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