2012
DOI: 10.1007/s12559-012-9153-4
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Using Human–Computer Interfaces to Investigate ‘Mind-As-It-Could-Be’ from the First-Person Perspective

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Cited by 27 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Some modulations are relatively subtle changes in perceptual experience (e.g., Davoli et al, 2012), while other phenomenological changes, such as those induced by one's mastery of sensory substitution systems, can be more profound (Lenay et al, 2003; Auvray and Myin, 2009). As we have observed in our research with various kinds of HCIs, the fact that skillful usage of an HCI must first be learned provides us with an opportunity to systematically investigate the development of new modes of perceptual experiencing (Froese et al, 2012). An added methodological bonus is that this development can happen long after infancy, i.e., at a time when the typical adult participants' standard perceptual modalities have normally long been formed already.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some modulations are relatively subtle changes in perceptual experience (e.g., Davoli et al, 2012), while other phenomenological changes, such as those induced by one's mastery of sensory substitution systems, can be more profound (Lenay et al, 2003; Auvray and Myin, 2009). As we have observed in our research with various kinds of HCIs, the fact that skillful usage of an HCI must first be learned provides us with an opportunity to systematically investigate the development of new modes of perceptual experiencing (Froese et al, 2012). An added methodological bonus is that this development can happen long after infancy, i.e., at a time when the typical adult participants' standard perceptual modalities have normally long been formed already.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno (2004) propose that "basic autonomy" is the capacity of a system to manage the flow of matter and energy through it so that it can regulate internal self-constructive and interactive exchange processes under far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic conditions. This conception of autonomy, as referring to processes of selfproduction, must be distinguished from the term's common use in robotics, where it is employed more loosely as the capacity of a system to move and interact without depending on remote control by an operator (Froese et al, 2007). Nevertheless, it is the strong sense of autonomy that allows us to talk about a system as being an individual that acts in relation to its intrinsic goals, i.e., of being a genuine agent (Barandiaran et al, 2009), rather than being a system whose functions are heteronomously defined from the outside.…”
Section: Autonomymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is ALife, not traditional AI, which has the tools in order to investigate the general principles of the biologically embodied mind (Di Paolo, 2003;Pfeifer et al, 2007b;Froese and Ziemke, 2009). At the same time, given the increasing interest in the science of consciousness, it is likely that these efforts www.frontiersin.org will be complemented by a growing emphasis on synthesizing and using new kinds of immersive and life-like human-computer interfaces to explore life-and mind-as-it-could-be from the first-person perspective (Froese et al, 2012b).…”
Section: Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…D'une certaine manière, ce quatrième courant est proche du premier mais y intègre les prémisses prises en compte par le troisième. On retrouverait alors l'idée initiale de l'intelligence artificielle mais en s'adressant au corps plus qu'à l'intellect (Froese et al 2011).…”
Section: Introductionunclassified