Using an exogenous mechanism to examine efficient probabilistic punishment

Qin, Xiangdong; Wang, Siyu

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.07.002

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A number of experimental studies reported that punishing just one, the worst contributor in a game, was enough to maintain cooperation [27,[40][41][42][43][44]. These observations are consistent with the present study in which the ONE variant as well as the ALL variant is effective to promote cooperation in risk averse individuals.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…Qin and Wang studied the effect of probabilistic punishment. In their study, they observed an inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability of punishment and the level of cooperation, suggesting that the participants' utility function was risk averse [40]. Moreover, children seem to be risk averse under the threat of punishment [28].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Risk aversion has been directly or indirectly observed in laboratory experiments of social dilemma games with punishment opportunity [27,28,40]. Yamagishi [27] reported that in his study, the mere existence of punishment was sufficient to promote cooperation in early trials of the social dilemma experiments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Nakamura

2019

Front. Phys.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Third-party punishment is a common mechanism to promote cooperation in humans. Theoretical models of evolution of cooperation predict that punishment maintains cooperation if it is sufficiently frequent. On the other hand, empirical studies have found that participants frequently punishing others do not success in comparison with those not eager to punish others, suggesting that punishment is suboptimal and thus should not be frequent. That being the case, our question is what mechanism, if any, can sustain cooperation even if punishment is rare. The present study proposes that one possible mechanism is risk-averse social learning. Using the method of evolutionary game dynamics, we investigate the effect of risk attitude of individuals on the question. In our framework, individuals select a strategy based on its risk, i.e., the variance of the payoff, as well as its expected payoff; risk-averse individuals prefer to select a strategy with low variable payoff. Using the framework, we examine the evolution of cooperation in two-player social dilemma games with punishment. We study two models: cooperators and defectors compete, while defectors may be punished by an exogenous authority; and cooperators, defectors, and cooperative punishers compete, while defectors may be punished by the cooperative punishers. We find that in both models, risk-averse individuals achieve stable cooperation with significantly low frequency of punishment. We also examine three punishment variants: in each game, all defectors are punished; only one of defectors is punished; and only a defector who exploits a cooperator or a cooperative punisher is punished. We find that the first and second variants effectively promote cooperation. Comparing the first and second variants, each can be more effective than the other depending on punishment frequency.

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Nakamura

2019

Front. Phys.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In fact, many peer-incentive experiments346 allow the same individual to be both rewarded and punished. We also mention here that a previous study used a different exogenous mechanism to examine efficient probabilistic punishment25.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here, it is not individuals who reward or punish; rather each individual is rewarded (or punished) with known probabilities that increase (or decrease) as the amount he/she contributed goes up25. In our experiments that include an institutional reward (respectively, punishment), exactly one member of the group is selected in this way to be rewarded (respectively, punished).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of institutional incentives and the exemplar in promoting cooperation

Zhang

et al. 2014

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

People on average do not play their individually rational Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy in game experiments based on the public goods game (PGG) that model social dilemmas. Differences from NE behavior have also been observed in PGG experiments that include incentives to cooperate, especially when these are peer-incentives administered by the players themselves. In our repeated PGG experiment, an institution rewards and punishes individuals based on their contributions. The primary experimental result is that institutions which both reward and punish (IRP) promote cooperation significantly better than either institutions which only punish (IP) or which only reward (IR), and that IP has contribution levels significantly above IR. Although comparing their single-round NE strategies correctly predicts which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, individuals do not play these strategies overall. Our analysis shows that other intrinsic motivations that combine conforming behavior with reactions to being rewarded/punished provide a better explanation of observed outcomes. In our experiments, some individuals who display more cooperation than other individuals can be regarded as the exemplars (or leaders). The role of these exemplars in promoting cooperation provides important insights into understanding cooperation in PGG and the effectiveness of institutional incentives at promoting desirable societal behavior.

show abstract

Game Theory and the Evolution of Cooperation

Zhang

Pei

2021

J. Oper. Res. Soc. China

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Using an exogenous mechanism to examine efficient probabilistic punishment

Cited by 11 publications

References 21 publications

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics

The role of institutional incentives and the exemplar in promoting cooperation

Game Theory and the Evolution of Cooperation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About