Recent developments in sensing technologies have enabled us to examine the nature of human social behavior in greater detail. By applying an information-theoretic method to the spatiotemporal data of cellphone locations, [C. Song et al., Science 327, 1018(2010] found that human mobility patterns are remarkably predictable. Inspired by their work, we address a similar predictability question in a different kind of human social activity: conversation events. The predictability in the sequence of one's conversation partners is defined as the degree to which one's next conversation partner can be predicted given the current partner. We quantify this predictability by using the mutual information. We examine the predictability of conversation events for each individual using the longitudinal data of face-to-face interactions collected from two company offices in Japan. Each subject wears a name tag equipped with an infrared sensor node, and conversation events are marked when signals are exchanged between sensor nodes in close proximity. We find that the conversation events are predictable to a certain extent; knowing the current partner decreases the uncertainty about the next partner by 28.4% on average. Much of the predictability is explained by longtailed distributions of interevent intervals. However, a predictability also exists in the data, apart from the contribution of their long-tailed nature. In addition, an individual's predictability is correlated with the position of the individual in the static social network derived from the data. Individuals confined in a community-in the sense of an abundance of surrounding triangles-tend to have low predictability, and those bridging different communities tend to have high predictability.
Non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs) play key roles in diverse cellular activities, and efficient ncRNA function requires extensive posttranscriptional nucleotide modifications. Small nucleolar RNAs (snoRNAs) are a group of ncRNAs that guide the modification of specific nucleotides in ribosomal RNAs (rRNAs) and small nuclear RNAs. To investigate the physiological relevance of rRNA modification in vertebrates, we suppressed the expression of three snoRNAs (U26, U44 and U78), either by disrupting the host gene splicing or by inhibiting the snoRNA precursor processing, and analyzed the consequences of snoRNA loss-of-function in zebrafish. Using a highly sensitive mass spectrometric analysis, we found that decreased snoRNA expression reduces the snoRNA-guided methylation of the target nucleotides. Impaired rRNA modification, even at a single site, led to severe morphological defects and embryonic lethality in zebrafish, which suggests that rRNA modifications play an essential role in vertebrate development. This study highlights the importance of posttranscriptional modifications and their role in ncRNA function in higher eukaryotes.
Cooperation is a hallmark of human society. Humans often cooperate with strangers even if they will not meet each other again. This so-called indirect reciprocity enables large-scale cooperation among nonkin and can occur based on a reputation mechanism or as a succession of pay-it-forward behavior. Here, we provide the functional and anatomical neural evidence for two distinct mechanisms governing the two types of indirect reciprocity. Cooperation occurring as reputation-based reciprocity specifically recruited the precuneus, a region associated with self-centered cognition. During such cooperative behavior, the precuneus was functionally connected with the caudate, a region linking rewards to behavior. Furthermore, the precuneus of a cooperative subject had a strong resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) with the caudate and a large gray matter volume. In contrast, pay-it-forward reciprocity recruited the anterior insula (AI), a brain region associated with affective empathy. The AI was functionally connected with the caudate during cooperation occurring as pay-it-forward reciprocity, and its gray matter volume and rsFC with the caudate predicted the tendency of such cooperation. The revealed difference is consistent with the existing results of evolutionary game theory: although reputation-based indirect reciprocity robustly evolves as a selfinterested behavior in theory, pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity does not on its own. The present study provides neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity and suggests that pay-it-forward reciprocity may not occur as myopic profit maximization but elicit emotional rewards.umans often help strangers even if helping is a costly behavior and repeated encounters among the same peers are not expected in the future. When cooperation among unacquainted individuals is established, the cost of the cooperation that an individual owes is reimbursed by somebody else's cooperation toward the individual. This so-called indirect reciprocity has been reported in a wide range of behavioral experiments and human communities, and it is thought to be a prime candidate mechanism for explaining large-scale cooperation among nonkin (1-3). Empirically, humans exhibit two types of indirect reciprocity: reputation-based reciprocity, in which they help others with good reputations to gain good reputations themselves (4-8); and pay-it-forward reciprocity, in which, independently of reputations, they help others after being helped by someone else (9-13).Evolutionary game theory explains reputation-based reciprocity as self-interested stable behavior under social learning (14-18). In contrast, cooperation in pay-it-forward reciprocity is theoretically unstable unless it is combined with an independent mechanism that allows evolution of cooperation (14,(19)(20)(21)(22), because helping others is not apparently rational in the absence of a reputation system or a different mechanism that independently enhances cooperation (3). Therefore, mechanisms by which humans commonly show pay-it-for...
Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient.
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