Using a high-performance, programmable secure coprocessor

Smith, Sean W.; Palmer, Elaine R.; Weingart, Steve H.

doi:10.1007/bfb0055474

Cited by 46 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The roots of hardware tamper protection run deep, and include seminal works such as Tygar and Yee's Dyad platform (Tygar and Yee, 1994) and Smith, Palmer, and Weingart's work on the IBM 4758 (Smith et al, 1998;Smith and Weingart, 1999). More recent academic work has focused on placing conductive patches randomly within potting material (Dragone, 2013) and obfuscating the system's hardware (Desai, 2013).…”

Section: Hardware Tamper Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving the Grid Defender’s Dilemma: Tamper Protection for Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems

Reeves

Smith

2015

Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography

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Abstract:Embedded devices installed as part of the smart grid rollout present a major dilemma for grid defenders, because they are soft targets that could allow an attacker to access critical assets (generators, control centers, etc.) deeper in the utility's network. While both physical tampering and intrusion protection are large, wellstudied fields, state-of-the-art protection schemes suffer from several flaws: They are not powerful enough to respond properly to different tamper events, their severe responses can lead to reduced grid availability, and they often require more setup resources than a utility operator can provide. To protect these networks, we present TEDDI (Tamper Event Detection on Distributed Infrastructure), a distributed, sensor-based tamper protection architecture for embedded devices on utility networks. TEDDI uses data gathered from across the network to make more-informed and more-accurate tamper decisions, and can customize its response based on the event it sees. It can also be configured and installed quickly, without needing a large base of knowledge beforehand. In this paper, we lay out the TEDDI architecture, and discuss how TEDDI solves the grid defender's dilemma better than current work.

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Section: Hardware Tamper Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving the Grid Defender’s Dilemma: Tamper Protection for Distributed Cyber-Physical Systems

Reeves

Smith

2015

Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography

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“…There are examples of more powerful cryptographic processors that encapsulate more codeSmith et al [11] have developed a more powerful crypto-co-processor and have looked at pushing various services (e.g. Kerberos [12] and file searching [13]) inside the protected boundary.…”

Section: Secure Hardware and Service Deliverymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Encapsulation of Security Services

Baldwin

Shiu

2003

Computer Security – ESORICS 2003

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“…Developing fast crypto hardware has been the major focus recently to accelerate security applications [24,3,21,23]. However, in spite of the effort in crafting the designs, the crypto-hardware here still inserts long latency on memory access due to the computation intensive nature.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bus-encryption microprocessors target for single application environments in which the code size is usually very small. Fast cryptographic co-processors have been developed to support security applications for Internet communication and E-commerce [3,24,21,23]. Such a co-processor can support multiple ciphers at competitive speed simultaneously.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%