US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis

Houghton, David Patrick

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491399

Cited by 63 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Third parties observe wartime behavior that helps them estimate their beliefs about the conflict (Gartner 1997). Third parties will use their lessons from past interactions with disputants to help them decide how to act (Houghton 1996, 2001; Hehir 2006). Potential intermediaries often have knowledge of the nature of the conflict and experiences with the leaders involved that allow them to generate expectations about the actions necessary for effective conflict management.…”

Section: Probability Of Successful Conflict Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1

Melin¹

2011

International Studies Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines if, when, and how states act to manage militarized disputes. I argue that the relationship between the third party and disputants, the management history, and the characteristics of the conflict help us understand when management occurs and the management techniques employed. I find substantial evidence that biased third parties are quick to offer management services and to employ economic and diplomatic techniques. Conditions that increase the perceived probability of conflict resolution, such as previous conflict management, and factors that lower the cost of conflict management, such as costly conflict, lead to the timely use of diplomatic and verbal techniques. The findings offer significant contributions to both the conflict management and alliance literatures.In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt met with Russian and Japanese delegates to discuss the Russo-Japanese War, finally mediating after over a year of fighting and an estimated 130,000 casualties (Morris 2001). Conversely, Roosevelt acted immediately when France and Germany collided over the division of Morocco (Roosevelt 1985). While some conflicts, like that between France and Germany, are managed early on, other disputes, such as the Russo-Japanese War, must wait for outside management to occur. Still other conflicts never involve the international community at all. Although the Roosevelt presidency was marked by an active approach to foreign policymaking, 2 the very nature of the foreign policy decision process involves trade-offs, leaving some disputants to resolve differences on their own. Recently, the conflicts of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan continued for prolonged periods without significant intervention despite extensive violence. Why did these conflicts continue while the international community took action in other conflicts before they turned deadly? Is there a systematic explanation of which conflicts receive the interest of outside parties and the timing of conflict management activities? two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The participants of the Journeys in World Politics workshop and members of the Working Group on Conflict Prevention also provided helpful suggestions. Sara McKeever, Andrea Morrison, and Jacob Hogan provided valuable research assistance. The Folke Bernadotte Academy provided financial support for the project.2 Roosevelt saw it as the duty of developed nations to help the underdeveloped world move forward. In Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal Zone, he used the army's medical service to eliminate the menace of the yellow fever and install a new regime of public health. He used the army to build up the infrastructure, building railways, telegraph and telephone lines, and upgrading roads and port facilities.

show abstract

Section: Probability Of Successful Conflict Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1

Melin¹

2011

International Studies Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a useful summary of the cognitive approach emphasizing the role of historical analogies in foreign policymaking, see Khong (1992). See also Houghton (2001). response vulnerable to at least three important pathologies: (1) the overvaluation of past success, (2) overconfidence in current policy, and (3) an insensitivity to warnings critical of existing policy (Jervis, 1976;Lebow, 1981, p. 112;Lebow & Stein, 1994, pp. 15, 282-287; see also Janis & Mann, 1977;Jervis, 1976).…”

Section: Psychological Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Parker

Stern

2002

Political Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The devastating terror attacks of 11 September 2001 have often been characterized as a "bolt from the blue." Drawing inspiration from the political psychological literature on strategic surprise, this article poses the deceptively simple question of why so many U.S. policymakers were caught so woefully off guard last year. Through a preliminary empirical exploration of three broad explanatory "cuts" derived from the relevant interdisciplinary literature-psychological, bureau-organizational, and agenda-political-the authors seek to shed light on the sources of failure that may have contributed to 9/11 and point to promising avenues of investigation for future research as the available empirical record becomes more complete.The terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (and the hijackings that enabled them) clearly caught the bulk of the U.S. leadership, the American people, and many supporters of liberal democracy around the world by surprise. Yet the severity of this shock should not be allowed to obscure the uncomfortable fact that the terrorists' motives and modus operandi were well known to many experts on terrorism within and outside of the U.S. government. 1

show abstract

“…Analogies compare what is “unknown” to a similar event that is already well understood, or “known.” In the Zashin and Chapman definition, analogy is expanded to encompass the added element of “discovery,” in which new or unknown phenomena are interpreted through the lens of the familiar. These events may be equated for their proximity in history, the experience—whether individual or prominently by the same generation—of particular policy makers in past events, or their perceived similarities of character (see as well: May 1973; Jervis 1976:217–282; Neustadt and May 1986; Khong 1992; Houghton 2001; Paris 2002:423–450).…”

Section: Analogy and Schema—interpreting Us Policy Decisions In Rwandamentioning

confidence: 99%

Curing the Somalia Syndrome: Analogy, Foreign Policy Decision Making, and the Rwandan Genocide

Brunk

2008

Foreign Policy Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

If Rwanda had been better understood at the outset of the 1994 genocide, would the world have responded differently? That the international community was afflicted with a “Somalia Syndrome,” suppressing the appetite for intervention in Rwanda, is not a new claim. What is new, however, is the effort this article makes to unravel the reasons for which two largely unrelated and distinct conflicts—Somalia and Rwanda—were perceived within many critical policy‐making quarters around the international community as identical “African” conflict‐types. It raises and explores the possibility that had Rwanda been perceived outside of this contorting “African” schema and its associated Somalia analogy, different policy responses could have been legitimized, opening the potential for a radically different international response.

show abstract

US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis

Cited by 63 publications

References 0 publications

The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1

The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1

Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Curing the Somalia Syndrome: Analogy, Foreign Policy Decision Making, and the Rwandan Genocide

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About