Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition

Sugeta, Hajime; Matsumoto, Shigeru

doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9085-8

Cited by 17 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(15 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Hamilton and Requate (2004) consider a case in which an environmental policy is set on the polluting input produced by an upstream firm, while downstream goods are traded in the international market. Sugeta and Matsumoto (2007) analyze the effects of upstream and downstream taxes to control pollution under input price discrimination. Canton et al (2008) and Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) consider a case in which upstream firms sell environmental goods to downstream polluting firms.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets

Ohori

2010

J Ind Compet Trade

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the optimal rate of environmental tax and level of privatization in a vertical relationship between one partially privatized producer and two private sellers. The main results are as follows: First, privatization of the producer firm decreases environmental damage. Second, the optimal environmental tax rate equals the Pigouvian level. Third, fully nationalizing the producer firm is optimal when the government simultaneously decides upon the environmental tax rate; then, privatization decreases social welfare.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets

Ohori

2010

J Ind Compet Trade

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This is done through the use of input-output table. An example of the way in which environmental taxes in a given sector can affect other sectors is provided by Sugeta and Matsumoto (2007). In their paper, they consider the case of vertically related markets posing the question of how to design an optimal taxation policy when firms in downstream sectors buy intermediate inputs from upstream firms and they both contribute to the emission of pollutants.…”

Section: The Role Of Intersectoral Linkagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Within-Sector, Upstream and Downstream Environmental Taxes on Innovation and Productivity

Franco

Marin

2015

Environ Resource Econ

104

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of environmental regulatory stringency on innovation and productivity using a panel of 8 European countries for 13 manufacturing sectors over the years 2001–2007. This research topic falls under the heading of the Porter hypothesis (PH) of which different versions have been tested. We consider both the strong and the weak versions of the PH, while also adding some peculiar features to the analysis. Firstly, we assess the role played by environmental taxes, that is an instrument rarely tested as a factor which can support the PH. Secondly, we analyse not only the effect of environmental taxes within a given sector (within-sector), but also the role played by environmental taxes in upstream and downstream sectors in terms of input–output relationships. Thirdly, we test these relationships also ‘indirectly’ by verifying whether innovation is one of the channels through which higher sectoral productivity can be achieved by imposing tighter environmental regulations. Our main findings suggest that downstream stringency is the most relevant driver of innovation and productivity while within-sector regulations only affect productivity but not innovation. Moreover, the effect of regulations on productivity is mostly direct, while the part of the effect mediated by induced innovations, as measured by patents, is relevant only for what concerns downstream regulations

show abstract