Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets

Ohori, Shuichi

doi:10.1007/s10842-010-0093-y

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The above proposition is in contrast to many of the existing papers such as Beladi and Chao (2006), Ohori (2012), Naito and Ogawa (2009) and . In contrast to these papers we show that when the products are differentiated and the public firm is unconcerned about environment, privatization can further damage the environment, if privatization is still below a critical level.…”

contrasting

confidence: 64%

“…However, these models ignored abatement measures, and of course output competition. Ohori (2012) extends this framework to vertical relationship. Cato (2008) have demonstrated that desirability of mixed oligopoly over private oligopoly depends on the extent of negative externalities generated through production.…”

Section: Barcena-ruiz Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…privatization leads to an improvement of environment). Similarly, in Ohori (2012) there is abatement, and hence the third term is present. But because it is a monopoly set up the direct effect dominates and we get the same effect as in Beladi and Chao (2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Pollution tax, partial privatization and environment

Pal

Saha

2015

Resource and Energy Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractConsidering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization.Whether privatization will improve the environment or not depends on the public firm's concern for environment. If the public firm is unconcerned about environment, the socially optimal privatization will also damage the environment most. But when the public firm is concerned about environment, privatization will improve the environment. Generally, the relationship between optimal privatization and product substitutability is also non-monotone and inverted U-shaped.Key words: Privatization, differentiated mixed duopoly, environmental damage, environmental tax, social welfare. Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment AbstractConsidering a differentiated mixed duopoly we show that when privatization and pollution tax are used together environmental damage will be non-monotone in the level of privatization, and optimal privatization is always partial privatization.Whether privatization will improve the environment or not depends on the public firm's concern for environment. If the public firm is unconcerned about environment, the socially optimal privatization will also damage the environment most. But when the public firm is concerned about environment, privatization will improve the environment. Generally, the relationship between optimal privatization and product substitutability is also non-monotone and inverted U-shaped.

show abstract

contrasting

confidence: 64%

Section: Barcena-ruiz Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Pollution tax, partial privatization and environment

Pal

Saha

2015

Resource and Energy Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We assume that the solutions are interior 1 0 c t − − > and 1 0 c ψ − − > . Following Beladi and Chao [2] and Ohori [6], firm 0 's objective function is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus (i.e., profits of both the firms) and is given by…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of studies have focused on optimal emission taxes under imperfect competition 3 . Taxing emissions in order to reduce social damage 1 Refer Bàrcena-Ruiz and Garzòn [1], Beladi and Chao [2], Kato [3], Naito and Ogawa [4], and Ohori [5] [6] for environmental policies in the markets of public firms. 2 Recent papers that have examined the endogenous choice between price and quantity strategies in a mixed oligopoly include Matsumura and Ogawa [7] and Nakamura [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price and Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax

Ohori¹

2014

TEL

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Effects of partial passive ownership on the desirable production timing of the public utility in a mixed upstream market

Xu,

Zhang,

Lee

2024

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider partial passive ownership (PPO) between upstream and downstream private firms and examine an endogenous production timing of a public utility in a mixed upstream market. We show that the production timing will shift from simultaneous to sequential as the PPO level decreases when the private share of the public utility ownership is low, which is mostly socially desirable. We also show that a higher private share does not yield socially desirable production timing irrespective of the PPO level, while a lower private share under the public utility's followership (Cournot competition) is optimal and time‐consistent when the PPO level is low (high). Our findings suggest that public utility ownership can be used as an industrial policy tool to coordinate desirable production timing.

show abstract

Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets

Cited by 17 publications

References 12 publications

Pollution tax, partial privatization and environment

Pollution tax, partial privatization and environment

Price and Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax

Effects of partial passive ownership on the desirable production timing of the public utility in a mixed upstream market

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About