Updating the Party Government data set

Seki, Katsunori; Williams, Laron K.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.10.001

Cited by 85 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Data on a party's share of seats in parliament are taken from the ParlGov data set (Döring and Manow, 2012). The second measure is the 'Ideological CPG' variable from the Party Government Dataset (PGD) (Woldendorp et al, 2011;Seki and Williams, 2014). This variable, developed by Woldendorp et al (1993) classifies every government on a scale from 1 to 5, based on the proportion of cabinet seats.…”

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000387 study of governments. Woldendorp et al (2011) include a measure of the 'ideological complexion of government (CPG)' for the 40 parliamentary democracies in their data set (updated by Seki and Williams, 2014). In a similar way, the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al, 2012) includes variables on the percentage of cabinet posts held by members from right-wing, centre, and left parties, and the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001) includes a variable indicating the left/right orientation of the government in economic terms.…”

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The ideational foundations of coercion: political culture and policies towards North Korea

Onderčo

Wagner

2015

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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The notion that states' foreign and security policies are not exclusively driven by material interests is now firmly established. Whose ideas matter and in what way, however, has remained subject to debate. We advance this debate by studying the crisis diplomacy of liberal democracies towards North Korea during four crises around the country's violation of international norms between 1993 and 2009. Although liberal democracies share a common perception of North Korea's nuclear programme as a threat to international peace and security, they differ widely in either confronting or accommodating North Korea. We examine the explanatory power of two ideational driving forces behind the foreign policy of liberal democracies: the ideological orientation of the government, on the one hand, and a country's political culture, on the other. Our analysis of 22 liberal democracies demonstrates that different domestic cultures of dealing with norm violations have a significant impact on crisis diplomacy: countries with punitive domestic cultures tend to adopt confrontational policies towards international norm violators; while left governments are not more accommodationist than right governments. Ideational differences across states are thus more pronounced than those within states.

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Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ideational foundations of coercion: political culture and policies towards North Korea

Onderčo

Wagner

2015

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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“…se (Andersson et al, 2012) and ParlGov.org (Döring and Manow, 2013) provide such information and enable it to be linked with information about party positions. This source has recently been transformed into a dataset and was updated by Seki and Williams (2014). 2 A data handbook by Woldendorp et al (2000) gives information about the portfolio distribution of cabinets in advanced democracies over the entire post-war period.…”

Section: Concept and Measures Of Power In Cabinetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting the left cabinet share: How to measure the partisan profile of governments in welfare state research

Döring

Schwander

2015

Journal of European Social Policy

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Measuring the power of the political left with the 'share of social democratic cabinet seats' is the gold standard in the literature on partisan effects. We argue that this measure of left power suffers from conceptual ambiguity and propose an alternative approach to measure the ideological orientation of governments based on their power in cabinets and data on party positions. We see several shortcomings of the traditional measure: the social democratic cabinet share neglects the fact that parties' ideological profiles differ across countries and have significantly changed over recent decades. Also, specific policy measures of party preferences are often more appropriate to gauge the government's position than relying on highly aggregated left/right measures. In addition, the social democratic cabinet share does not take into account the impact of coalition partners, cabinet decision making and the possibility of minority governments relying on parliamentary support outside the cabinet on the ability of parties to implement the social policies. After discussing the reasons for the conceptual ambiguity of existing indicators for the power of the left, we present alternative measures for the ideological orientation of the government based on the composition of cabinets and different information about party positions. We demonstrate how these measures can be combined to a single indicator that takes into account both the ideological position of governing parties in a particular policy domain and their power to affect cabinet decisions. We critically discuss the availability and merits of data on party positions and cabinet compositions and provide recommendations for constructing measures in welfare state research.

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“…Data on incumbent finance ministry parties comes from Seki and Williams (2014). Model 1 in Table 3 acts as a baseline and simply reports the results from Model 2 in Table 2.…”

Section: Online Appendix A: Finance Ministry Partymentioning

confidence: 99%

It’s Not Only What you Say, It’s Also How You Say It: The Strategic Use of Campaign Sentiment

Crabtree¹,

Golder²,

Gschwend³

et al. 2018

Preprint

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What explains the type of electoral campaign run by political parties? We provide a new perspective on campaigns that focuses on the strategic use of emotive language. We argue that the level of positive sentiment parties adopt in their campaigns depends on their incumbency status, their policy position, and objective economic conditions. We test these claims with a novel dataset that captures the emotive language used in over 400 party manifestos across eight European countries. As predicted, we find that incumbent parties, particularly incumbent prime ministerial parties, use more positive sentiment than opposition parties. We find that ideologically moderate parties employ higher levels of positive sentiment than extremist parties. And we find that all parties exhibit lower levels of positive sentiment when the economy is performing poorly but that this negative effect is weaker for incumbents. Our analysis has important implications for research on campaign strategies and retrospective voting. (Downs, 1957;Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Schofield, 2003;Adams, 2001;Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005;Adams, Scheiner and Kawasumi, 2016). The second dimension captures campaign focus -whether parties adopt campaign messages that focus on themselves or their opponents (Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995;Lau and Pomper, 2002;Geer, 2006;Elmelund-Praestekaer, 2008Hansen and Pedersen, 2008). One aspect of campaigns that is ignored in this two-dimensional framework is campaign sentiment, which refers to the emotive content of campaigns. Whereas campaign content and campaign focus address what parties say and who they say it about, campaign sentiment addresses how they say it.Scholars are increasingly looking at how the emotive content of campaign messages affects voter behavior Roseman, Abelson and Ewing, 1986;Weber, Searles and Ridout, 2011;Utych, 2018). The common thread in this literature is that voters are not merely influenced by the substantive content of campaigns but also by their emotive content. Studies have repeatedly shown that electoral campaigns can be manipulated to trigger emotional responses that, in turn, produce predictable changes in voter behavior. This raises a natural question. If campaign sentiment influences voter behavior, political actors should be strategic about its use. Are they? To date, there has been little research that explicitly looks at the strategic use of emotion in election campaigns. What research there is tends to focus on the historically majoritarian systems in the United States and the United Kingdom (Ridout and Searles, 2011; Kosmidis et al., Forthcoming). 1 In this article, we examine the strategic use of emotive language in European election campaigns.Studies that look at emotion in campaigns often focus on the use of images and music . However, language can also engender different types of sentiment, such as fear, anxiety, sadness, or optimism (Roseman, Abelson and Ewing, 1986;Pennebaker, 1993;Pennebaker and Francis, 1996). We build on a long tradition that emphasizes...

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Updating the Party Government data set

Cited by 85 publications

References 22 publications

The ideational foundations of coercion: political culture and policies towards North Korea

The ideational foundations of coercion: political culture and policies towards North Korea

Revisiting the left cabinet share: How to measure the partisan profile of governments in welfare state research

It’s Not Only What you Say, It’s Also How You Say It: The Strategic Use of Campaign Sentiment

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