Updating on Biased Probabilistic Testimony

Vignero, Leander

doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00545-7

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 52 publications

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“…Beyond degree-theoretic generalizations of the current framework there are probabilistic extensions, such as Bayesian pragmatics (see Franke & Jäger, 2016, and references therein), which includes models of communication under uncertainty or conflict of interest such as the Rational Speech Act model (Frank, 2017;Franke, 2011;Goodman & Frank, 2016;Sumers et al, 2021). This literature provides a further bridge between the two areas of study we mentioned, interpretation, and persuasion, by offering some insight into the cognitive science of social understanding (Barnett et al, 2022;Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 2013;Oey et al, 2023;Vignero, 2022). We regard it as a strength of a game-theoretic analysis of Stalnakerian conversations that speech act theory can then be seen as central to multiple areas of inquiry.…”

Section: A Language Game For Rejectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rejection game

Incurvati

Sbardolini²

2023

Mind & Language

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We introduce the rejection game, designed to formalize the interaction between interlocutors in a Stalnakerian conversation: a speaker who asserts something and a listener who may accept or reject. The rejection game is similar to other signalling games known to the literature in economics and biology. We point out similarities and differences, and propose an application in linguistics. We uncover basic conditions under which the Gricean maxim of quality emerges from incentives among the players, providing evidence for a functionalist understanding of the Gricean program.

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Section: A Language Game For Rejectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rejection game

Incurvati

Sbardolini²

2023

Mind & Language

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A Pragmatic Account of the Weak Evidence Effect

2022

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Language is not only used for neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker’s “hidden agenda” when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmatic account for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, this model predicts a systematic relationship between belief updates and expectations about the information source: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals and prefer the strongest evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest further avenues for rational models of social reasoning to illuminate classical decision-making phenomena.

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Updating on Biased Probabilistic Testimony

Cited by 2 publications

References 52 publications

The rejection game

The rejection game

A Pragmatic Account of the Weak Evidence Effect

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