Unwilling or willing but unable: can horses interpret human actions as goal directed?

Trösch, Miléna; Bertin, Emma; Calandreau, Ludovic; Nowak, Raymond; Lansade, Léa

doi:10.1007/s10071-020-01396-x

Cited by 15 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(50 reference statements)

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“…Thus, all three measures strongly suggest that dogs distinguished in their reactions between the experimenter's intentional and unintentional actions. www.nature.com/scientificreports/ This concurs with findings of previous studies on other species that also found subjects to distinguish in their behavioural reactions to intentional and unintentional withholding of rewards 12,[18][19][20][21][22][23] . Following interpretations of these findings in other species, this indicates that dogs can indeed recognize human intention-in-action.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

“…In cases where an intention has been realized successfully it is hard to tell whether dogs react to the action's outcome or to the underlying intention. Accordingly, the methodological approach to study intentions in both human and nonhuman animals has been to examine their responses to failed attempts and accidental behavior 12,[18][19][20][21][22][23] . To our knowledge this approach has not been used with dogs, yet.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead, it examines whether subjects react differently towards a human agent who either intentionally (being unwilling) or unintentionally (being unable) withheld rewards from them. Using this paradigm, the capacity to distinguish intentional from unintentional behaviour has been found not only in human infants 12,20 but also in chimpanzees 18 , African grey parrots 21 , capuchins 22 , Tonkean macaques 19 and horses 23 . Some of these species lost interest in the unwilling-condition earlier than in the unable-condition.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Dogs distinguish human intentional and unintentional action

Schünemann

Keller

Rakoczy

et al. 2021

Sci Rep

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When dogs interact with humans, they often show appropriate reactions to human intentional action. But it is unclear from these everyday observations whether the dogs simply respond to the action outcomes or whether they are able to discriminate between different categories of actions. Are dogs able to distinguish intentional human actions from unintentional ones, even when the action outcomes are the same? We tested dogs’ ability to discriminate these action categories by adapting the so-called “Unwilling vs. Unable” paradigm. This paradigm compares subjects’ reactions to intentional and unintentional human behaviour. All dogs received three conditions: In the unwilling-condition, an experimenter intentionally withheld a reward from them. In the two unable-conditions, she unintentionally withheld the reward, either because she was clumsy or because she was physically prevented from giving the reward to the dog. Dogs clearly distinguished in their spontaneous behaviour between unwilling- and unable-conditions. This indicates that dogs indeed distinguish intentional actions from unintentional behaviour. We critically discuss our findings with regard to dogs’ understanding of human intentional action.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Dogs distinguish human intentional and unintentional action

Schünemann

Keller

Rakoczy

et al. 2021

Sci Rep

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“…This paradigm has yielded similar results in capuchins and Tonkean macaques (Canteloup et al, 2016;Phillips et al, 2009). Some non-primates also seem able to consider both the intentions and the outcomes of performed actions: grey parrots (Péron et al, 2010) and even horses (Trösch et al, 2020) behave differently when confronted with an unwilling versus an unable experimenter offering food rewards. Some intentions are simple and clear, or are even broadcasted, whereas other intentions are hidden -organisms may deliberately hide their intentions in order to trick others.…”

Section: Attributing Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

Manrique

Zeidler

Roberts

et al. 2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

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“…These include primates (reviewed in Krupenye, 2021) such as great apes (Kano & Call, 2014), capuchin monkeys (Phillips et al, 2009) and Tonkean macaques (Canteloup & Meunier, 2017). There is also evidence in other species, for example in grey parrots (Péron et al, 2010) and horses (Trösch et al, 2020). That intention reading is a complex trait is also highlighted by the fact that children gradually increase this skill (Behne et al, 2005;Hamlin, 2013;Liu et al, 2019).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative intentions and their implications on reciprocal cooperation in Norway rats

Schweinfurth

2021

Ethology

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Human adults perceive others as intentional agents and attribute thoughts, beliefs and intentions to them, which helps to explain and predict the behaviour of others (Gummerum & Chu, 2014). Understanding others' intentions is fundamental for legal systems, sport competitions and many other of our daily interactions. Furthermore, reading intentions might be especially important in the context of reciprocal cooperation, where individuals help those that are cooperative (Trivers, 1971).Reciprocity is a strong determining factor for human behaviour; we reciprocate with familiar and unfamiliar partners on an almost daily basis (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). In order to only cooperate with helpful

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Unwilling or willing but unable: can horses interpret human actions as goal directed?

Cited by 15 publications

References 32 publications

Dogs distinguish human intentional and unintentional action

Dogs distinguish human intentional and unintentional action

The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation

Cooperative intentions and their implications on reciprocal cooperation in Norway rats

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