2005
DOI: 10.1162/0163660053295176
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Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and future proliferation networks

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Cited by 50 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…Khan show that Iran had been the beneficiary of uranium enrichment technology. 45 While Khan's trade was allegedly rogue, without any official Pakistani sanction, there are suspicions of a degree of official complicity in his operations. 46 Iran's pro-Pakistan tilt negated any public Indian moves for building a strategic entente with Iran.…”
Section: The Nuclearisation Of South Asiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Khan show that Iran had been the beneficiary of uranium enrichment technology. 45 While Khan's trade was allegedly rogue, without any official Pakistani sanction, there are suspicions of a degree of official complicity in his operations. 46 Iran's pro-Pakistan tilt negated any public Indian moves for building a strategic entente with Iran.…”
Section: The Nuclearisation Of South Asiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, with time, his nuclear network extended much beyond India. The underlying motivation for his call for proliferation was "pan-Islamism and hostility to western controls on nuclear technology" (Albright and Hinderstein, 2005). Thus, Khan befriended countries like Iran, Libya and North Korea through nuclear collaboration.…”
Section: ) Involvement Of the Outside Powers In Pakistan's Nuclear Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At its height, this network was dispersed over three continents and involved numerous individuals and companies that knowingly or unwittingly aided its proliferation sales to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and several other countries. 6 This network rivaled legitimate suppliers in its ability to sell nuclear facilities and capabilities to states.…”
Section: Who Depends On Illicit Nuclear Trade Todaymentioning
confidence: 99%