Detecting and Disrupting Illicit Nuclear Trade after A.Q. Khan

Combining modeling and gaming for predictive analytics

“…Still, we can infer from this anecdotal evidence a likely and significant increase in activity volume enabled by computerizing aspects of game play. Manual inspection and analysis of player communication histories showed patterns similar to published examples of real-world scenarios (in particular, one such example includes a technique of sending out multiple requests which end up converging on a single supplier, as described in an example of a country seeking large quantities of valves for a gas centrifuge program [17]). Particular player behavioral patterns (for example, use of third parties to indirectly acquire goods) were used as guides for behavioral patterns that the ABM model agents should produce.…”

Why do entities get involved in proliferation? Exploring the criminology of illicit WMD-related trade

“…75 Moreover, proliferation prosecution rarely results in sufficiently severe punishment; offenders "continue to receive low penalties even when violators are convicted." 76 The fate of the Khan network, for example, led one commentator to describe WMD proliferation as "the crime with no punishment." 77 While many members of the network served some time in prison or under house arrest, most members of the network evaded serious penalty due to the complexity of investigating their activities, various shortfalls in national export-control legislation, and difficulties in obtaining mutual legal assistance from foreign governments and the extradition of key parties.…”

Arms Supply and Proliferation Networks

“…Even "first-tier" nuclear assistance has often appeared to be centralized, with each nuclear program attempting to take advantage of prior or concurrent nuclear programs through spying (Reed and Stillman 2009), although it is still debated how useful most of this assistance has been Montgomery 2013). The A. Q. Khan network demonstrates both the advantages and disadvantages of network structures for proliferation: while it enabled first Pakistan and then Iran, Libya, and North Korea to take advantage of Khan's diffuse supply network, it also generated a wealth of indicators and warnings for intelligence communities to map the network before rolling it up (Albright, Brannan, and Stricker 2010;Corera 2006;Montgomery 2005Montgomery , 2013. Similarly, Aum Shinrikyo's acquisitions could have provided early indicators of its intentions before the Tokyo subway sarin gas attacks (Picarelli 1998).…”