This article considers whether NATO won the war in Kosovo by spin, tricking Milosevic into believing that a ground invasion was imminent. It argues that during the conflict over Kosovo the propaganda war for public opinion was perceived by British and US governments as vitally important. NATO elites attempted to address (at least) eleven different audiences with a message appropriate to each. The two key audiences were, first, NATO public opinion which had to be reassured of the legitimacy of NATO's war against Kosovo and was also unsettled about the prospect of deploying ground troops. Simultaneously, NATO attempted to communicate to the second audience, Milosevic and the Serb elite, a more aggressive message that it would take whatever steps were needed to prevail. Using various 'political skills' NATO escalated the propaganda war against Milosevic while attempting to pacify domestic opinion and this may well have played an important role in the capitulation of the Serb leader.That NATO could win militarily was never really in doubt. The only battle we might lose was the battle for the hearts and minds. The consequence would have been NATO ending the bombing and losing the war. Keeping public support, keeping the alliance united, and showing Milosevic we were united, was what we were all about.Our enemy, as spokesmen, was Milosevic's media machine but our judge and ury was the Western media. Alastair Campbell, Prime Minister's Press Secretary, Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, July 1999.This article critically reviews three leading positions on the role of public opinion and the media in foreign policy and argues that public opinion places both perceived and real constraints on the British and US governments. 1