2009
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9417-3
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Universals

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing's being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.

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Cited by 26 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 49 publications
(28 reference statements)
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“…If they did, this would (given Serious Actualism) undercut the aim of letting certain propositions be true with respect to worlds without existing at those worlds. This feature of the view also, I think, avoids the argument of Carmichael (2010), § 2.2 that views of the sort being developed here are committed to rejecting the S4 and S5 axioms. 31 Plantinga (1983) argues convincingly that some ways of letting propositions be possible but not possibly true-like those which identify possibility with possible nonfalsehood-lead to unacceptable assignments of necessity and possibility to propositions.…”
Section: Socrates Does Not Exist Ufi () Socrates Exists)mentioning
confidence: 56%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…If they did, this would (given Serious Actualism) undercut the aim of letting certain propositions be true with respect to worlds without existing at those worlds. This feature of the view also, I think, avoids the argument of Carmichael (2010), § 2.2 that views of the sort being developed here are committed to rejecting the S4 and S5 axioms. 31 Plantinga (1983) argues convincingly that some ways of letting propositions be possible but not possibly true-like those which identify possibility with possible nonfalsehood-lead to unacceptable assignments of necessity and possibility to propositions.…”
Section: Socrates Does Not Exist Ufi () Socrates Exists)mentioning
confidence: 56%
“…If they did, this would (given Serious Actualism) undercut the aim of letting certain propositions be true with respect to worlds without existing at those worlds. This feature of the view also, I think, avoids the argument of Carmichael (2010), § 2.2 that views of the sort being developed here are committed to rejecting the S4 and S5 axioms.…”
mentioning
confidence: 56%
“…4. See Brown (2004), Carmichael (2010, Chomsky (2005), Maffesoli (2007) and Schatzky (2003) for more information. Maffesoli, on page 81, raises the argument that humanity needs to formalise an understanding of 'heterology', the real existence of multiples.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Something is a predicable just in case it can be true or false of something, i.e. possess an extension and anti‐extension (Carmichael : 373). Predicables might include properties , i.e.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…ways things can be thought of as being, and even linguistic expressions (cf. Carmichael : 373–4). Second, a class is a collection with a membership‐condition.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%