On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions

Speaks, Jeff

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00616.x

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Zgodnie z takim poglądem nie ma potrzeby postulowania istnienia reprezentacji de re, ponieważ światy możliwe, tak samo jak świat aktualny, nie posiadają w ogóle indywiduów, które mogłyby być opisywane przez takie reprezentacje. Jeżeli zaś sądy jednostkowe są ontologicznie zależne od swoich elementów składowych, to jeśli w danym świecie możliwym te elementy nie istnieją, to sądy jednostkowe o nich traktujące również nie istnieją (Plantinga 1983;Speaks 2012). Według radykalnego antyhaecceityzmu struktura metafizyczna każdego świata możliwego jest wyłącznie ogólna i składa jedynie z wzorców własności i/lub relacji, które mogą zostać w pełni opisane przy pomocy czysto jakościowego języka.…”

Section: Pierwszymunclassified

Esencjalizm, antyhaecceityzm i haecceityzm

Lenart

2019

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Section: Pierwszymunclassified

Esencjalizm, antyhaecceityzm i haecceityzm

Lenart

2019

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“…This presupposes the general view, sometimes called 'serious actualism', that an object x has a property P in a world w only if x exists in w (Plantinga 1979: 145). 11 See e.g., Adams (1981Adams ( , 1986, Salmon (1986Salmon ( , 2007, Soames (1987), Braun (1993), Fitch (1994Fitch ( , 1996, King (2007King ( , 2014, Speaks (2012), and Fitch and Nelson (2014)), inter alia. All cited agree that propositions are structured entities and so endorse a broadly 'neo-Russelian' view of singular propositions.…”

Section: The Problem With Singular Propositionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Virtues of Thisness Presentism

Ingram

2016

Philos Stud

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Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can't express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don't exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent 'common sense' status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and defend a version of presentism ('Thisness Presentism') that avoids the unacceptable implications. The basic strategy I employ is familiar-I postulate presently existing entities to serve as surrogates (or 'proxies') for non-present entities-but some of the details of my proposal are more novel, and their application to these problems is certainly novel. One overarching thesis of this paper is that Thisness Presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism since it solves important problems facing standard iterations of the view. And I assume that this is a good positive reason in favour of the underlying thisness ontology.

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“…Thus, the ability to accommodate object-dependence will not appeal to such propositionalists. For discussion of this problem, see Plantinga, 1983, 1985, Fine, 1985, David, 2009, and Speaks (Forthcoming).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of propositional constituency

Keller

2013

Can. J. of Philosophy

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In this paper, I criticize Structured Propositionalism, the most widely held theory of the nature of propositions according to which they are structured entities with constituents. I argue that the proponents of Structured Propositionalism have paid insufficient attention to the metaphysical presuppositions of the view – most egregiously, to the notion of propositional constituency. This is somewhat ironic, since the friends of structured propositions tend to argue as if the appeal to constituency gives their view a dialectical advantage. I criticize four different approaches to providing a metaphysics of propositional constituency: set-theoretic, mereological, hylomorphic, and structure-making. Finally, I consider the option of taking constituency in a deflationary, metaphysically ‘lightweight’ sense. I argue that, though invoking constituency in a lightweight sense may be useful for avoiding the ontological problems that plague the ‘heavyweight’ conception, it no longer proffers a dialectical advantage to Structured Propositionalism.

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On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions

Cited by 16 publications

References 26 publications

Esencjalizm, antyhaecceityzm i haecceityzm

Esencjalizm, antyhaecceityzm i haecceityzm

The Virtues of Thisness Presentism

The metaphysics of propositional constituency

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