The metaphysics of propositional constituency

Abstract

In this paper, I criticize Structured Propositionalism, the most widely held theory of the nature of propositions according to which they are structured entities with constituents. I argue that the proponents of Structured Propositionalism have paid insufficient attention to the metaphysical presuppositions of the view – most egregiously, to the notion of propositional constituency. This is somewhat ironic, since the friends of structured propositions tend to argue as if the appeal to constituency gives their view a dialectical advantage. I criticize four different approaches to providing a metaphysics of propositional constituency: set-theoretic, mereological, hylomorphic, and structure-making. Finally, I consider the option of taking constituency in a deflationary, metaphysically ‘lightweight’ sense. I argue that, though invoking constituency in a lightweight sense may be useful for avoiding the ontological problems that plague the ‘heavyweight’ conception, it no longer proffers a dialectical advantage to Structured Propositionalism.

Propositions on the cheap

“…For example, if p is a proposition that is abstracted from the a class of mental states each of which represents Oscar, we might speak, derivatively, of p having Oscar as a constituent. This idea is very much in keeping with a recent distinction drawn between "lightweight constituency" and "heavyweight constituency" in Keller (2013). See Speaks's Chapter 11 in King et al (2013) for more in the same vein.…”

Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names

“…I will assume that there are such things as propositions, and that they can in principle be the contents of sentences. I will also assume that the claim that propositions have constituents can be made sense of, although I won't give a theory of what that amounts to; see Keller (2013) for the problems that this idea brings with it. For simplicity I will assume that a proposition can be perspicuously represented as an ordered sequence of objects and properties: the proposition that Neptune is a planet can be represented as Neptune, being-a-planet .…”

The Structure of Content is Not Transparent

“…The question of structure in general, and propositional structure in particular, is a vexed one (Keller 2013;Gilmore 2014;Merricks 2015, chaps 4-5;Glick 2017). I am avoiding some issues by assuming that propositions are structured, and I will not offer a view about what it means for a proposition to be structured.…”