Universal Exceptionalism in International Law

Bradford, Anu; Posner, Eric A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1551355

Cited by 25 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The question here is not about exceptionalism, or the acceptability of the United States opting out of international treaties based on the interests of the United States. Deliberately refraining from participating in international law may be justified by a variety of reasons and is done by a number of countries (Safrin ; Bradford and Posner ).…”

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confidence: 99%

An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

Kelley¹,

Pevehouse

2015

Int Stud Q

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The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of US participation. We supplement these explanations with an opportunity cost theory. We argue that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time and political capital. These costs alter the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process. Statistical analysis supports the argument. The priority the Senate and President give to treaties depends not only on the value they assign to the treaty, but also on the value of the time needed to process the treaty. Presidents are less, not more, likely to transmit treaties to the Senate the more support they have in Congress. Furthermore, the more support the President has in Congress, the more the cost of Senate floor time matters for advice and consent.

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confidence: 99%

An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

Kelley¹,

Pevehouse

2015

Int Stud Q

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“…609 Europe as well has often been considered exceptional; its exceptionality rests in its pacifist social welfare model which strongly promotes human rights. 610 If we look at the behaviour of any major power, its interpretation and application of the rules of international law is always somehow exceptional. In a way exceptionalism is the rule in the international arena.…”

Section: Chinese 'Exceptionalism' Looked At From the Perspective Of Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Anu Bradford and Eric Posner suggested, instead of looking at whether a particular vision or position is exceptional, it would be much more interesting to see whether that vision of international law is appealing in terms of a country's foreign policy and morality. 613 The idea that China is exceptional or deviating in reality betrays a particular set of assumptions: states should comply with the rules of a particular juridical system and a legal and political culture, predicated on global terms, beyond the state. Constitutional principles, however, are grounded in the European Enlightenment, its intellectual history and in the French and American Revolution that promoted the formation of the liberal democratic state.…”

Section: Chinese 'Exceptionalism' Looked At From the Perspective Of Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Constitutionalism without Global Democracy (?)

Corradetti

Sartor

2016

SSRN Journal

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The contributions in this volume investigate interconnected aspects of the democratic deficit in global constitutionalism. The commonly shared question is the following: to what extent, if any, a global (or cosmopolitan) shift of international law can proceed absent a transnational democratic check? Some scholars are convinced that this is a real problem since that a 'division of labour' is to be recognized between national and regional/international legal levels, only the first needing a democratic legitimacy. The contributors to this volume, on the contrary tend to share the view that detaching the production of international law from constituent will, as well as from a democratic framework, can indeed undermine constitutional legitimacy. Furthermore, this may open the way to forms of domination that affect also state's democratic institutions from within. What is the way out from this deadlock? How is it possible to tame global constitutionalism in order to avoid a global Leviathan? The collection of essays here presented attempts to conceptualize some of the central challenges affecting contemporary patterns of legal dispersion and fragmentation. They follow a conceptual-historical thread which starts with a modern Kantian understanding of the problem, and unfolds into the discussion of issues of constitutional pluralism, institutional legitimacy and the risk of tyranny. The volume includes analyses of the role of China and the EU, two of the most important actors, even though perhaps at the opposite pole of the global constitutional project.

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“…First, we maintain that one can hardly speak of exceptionalism as an "established concept" that goes beyond the case of American exceptionalism. Far from employing a widely accepted definition of exceptionalism, the existing literature is ambiguous about whether exceptionalism and exemptionalism necessarily go hand in hand, or whether the latter is just a possible trait of the former (e.g., Holsti 2010;Bradford and Posner 2011;Patman and Southgate 2016;Wheeler 2003;Hughes 2015). One of our motivations behind writing this article is precisely that one needs to look beyond American exceptionalism to be able to say something about exceptionalism per se.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, the opposite may be true. If we simply equated exceptionalism with exemptionalism, we would lose sight of exceptionalism as one amongst several potential motivations behind exemptionalism in international law (Bradford and Posner 2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Comparative Exceptionalism: Universality and Particularity in Foreign Policy Discourses

Nymalm

Plagemann

2018

International Studies Review

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Existing research on exceptionalism in foreign policy suggests a number of confrontational features making it a threat to peaceful international relations. Largely based on US and European cases, and hardly ever taking a comparative approach, this literature overlooks a variety of exceptionalisms in non-Western countries, including so called "rising powers" such as China and India. A comparison between exceptionalist foreign policy discourses of the United States, China, India, and Turkey shows that exceptionalism is neither exclusive to the United States, nor a "new" phenomenon within rising powers, nor necessarily confrontational, unilateralist, or exemptionalist. As a prerequisite for comparative work, we establish two features common to all exceptionalist foreign policy discourses. In essence, such discourses are informed by supposedly universal values derived from a particular civilization heritage or political history. In order to systematize different versions of exceptionalism, we then propose four ideal types, each of which reflects exceptionalism's common trait of a claim to moral superiority and uniqueness but diverges across other important dimensions, with implications for its potentially offensive character. The article concludes by formulating a research agenda for future comparative work on exceptionalist foreign policy discourses and their repercussions for great power relations and global politics.

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Universal Exceptionalism in International Law

Cited by 25 publications

References 26 publications

An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

Global Constitutionalism without Global Democracy (?)

Comparative Exceptionalism: Universality and Particularity in Foreign Policy Discourses

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