An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior

Abstract

The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of US participation. We supplement these explanations with an opportunity cost theory. We argue that the advice and consent process sometimes slows or stalls because it imposes costs in terms of legislative time and political capital. These costs alter the calculus of key players and may obstruct the process. Statistical analysis supports the argument. The priority the Senate and President give to treaties depends not only on the value they assign to the treaty, but also on the value of the time needed to process the treaty. Presidents are less, not more, likely to transmit treaties to the Senate the more support they have in Congress. Furthermore, the more support the President has in Congress, the more the cost of Senate floor time matters for advice and consent.

The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: insights from international environmental agreements

“…A review of the literature highlights that states participate in international (environmental) agreements as long as the benefits stemming from accession outweigh the costs (Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2004;Bernauer et al, 2010;Wangler, Altamirano-Cabrera and Weikard, 2013;Kelley and Pevehouse, 2015;Pollack, 2015).…”

“…Other research looks authoritarian states and finds that there is significant variation in the participation behavior among them (e.g., Leinaweaver, 2012;Mattes and Rodríguez, 2014). Further influences at the domestic level pertain to interest groups and veto players (e.g., Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000;Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2004;Bernhagen, 2008;Urpelainen, 2010;Bernauer, Böhmelt and Koubi, 2013;Hugh-Jones, Milewicz and Ward, 2016), electoral systems, election periods and constitutional institutions (e.g., Cazals and Sauquet, 2015;Kelley and Pevehouse, 2015;Kiesow Cortez and Gutmann, 2015), income levels (e.g., Bernauer et al, 2010;Haftel and Thompson, 2013), and military or economic power aspects (e.g., Elsig, Milewicz and Stürchler, 2011;Haftel and Thompson, 2013;Milewicz and Elsig, 2014).…”

Cooperation by Treaty: The Role of Multilateral Powers

“…26. American "exceptionalism" has been variously attributed to its ideological commitment to democratic constitutionalism (Rubenfeld 2004), its liberal values (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990), and the structure of its political system (Chayes 2008) including its unique ratification procedures (Hathaway 2008;and Kelley and Pevehouse 2015). However, American exceptionalism on treaty participation can be understood in terms of its unprecedented power and its unique position in the international system (Byers and Nolte 2003;and Scott 2004).…”

Promoting trade through private law: Explaining international legal harmonization

“…A possible hindrance is the opportunity costs of treaty ratification. As Kelley and Pevehouse (2015) explain, treaties compete for space on the agenda of the executive and the legislature: time spent on ratifying treaties means less time for producing domestic legislation. When the legislature is busy passing legislation, it will have less time for treaties, and ratification will take longer.…”