Unifying Psychology through Situational Realism

Petocz, Agnes; Mackay, Nigel

doi:10.1037/a0032937

Cited by 16 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 95 publications

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“…Probabilistic functionalism is a Darwinian approach to psychological phenomena and research methods developed by Egon Brunswik (1939). In common with other more recent proposals (see Petocz & Mackay, 2013;Marsh & Boag, 2014), Brunswik (1952) characterises psychological phenomena as situated within organism-environment relations. Brunswik's (1952) conceptual framework is novel in that: i) individual differences in psychological phenomena are understood as 6 situated in organism-environment relationships, with the organism and environment individually regarded as a unique and interacting system (Hammond, 1966); ii) it requires that variation in the environment is systematically tracked, with environmental variation considered as at least as important as variation both within and between, individuals.…”

Section: Probabilistic Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 82%

From Cronbach to Brunswik: A Conceptual Framework for Personality and Individual Differences Research

Nowland¹

2017

Preprint

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Recent personality literature has proposed that Cronbach’s generalisability theory offers a substantive ground for the integration of inter-individual differences and intra¬personal process approaches to personality trait research. Generalisability theory has the advantage of maximising psychometric dependability of behavioural measurements, but does not demand reconciliation to the environment that is relevant to the life circumstances of the participant. A conceptual analysis contrasting generalisability theory with Egon Brunswik’s conceptual framework for psychology is presented. Recommendations regarding the connection between theory and methodological practice follow, in light of an evolutionary approach to personality and individual differences. An example that highlights the contrast between Cronbachian and Brunswikian approaches is presented, resulting in a recommendation to revisit the concept of ecological validity and representational research design, to better account for what is reflected in study outcomes for personality constructs.

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Section: Probabilistic Functionalismmentioning

confidence: 82%

From Cronbach to Brunswik: A Conceptual Framework for Personality and Individual Differences Research

Nowland¹

2017

Preprint

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“…As was outlined in Petocz and Mackay (2013), situational realism is a psychological research tradition that has emerged from the intellectual legacy of the philosopher John Anderson (see also, Mackay & Petocz, 2011, for a detailed cross-section of the current state of situational realism). Although there is some degree of conceptual overlap between situational realism and other contemporary philosophically realist traditions in psychology (compare, for instance, Charles, 2013, Heft, 2013, and Tonneau, 2013), the Andersonian approach can be distinguished by its particularly staunch commitment to (a) a strictly monistic (as opposed to dualist) material ontology (a single spatiotemporal universe of infinite complexity), (b) the conceptual emphasis placed on the infinite complexity of real situations, and (c) the centrality of the distinction between objects and relations.…”

Section: A Pull Toward Safety–situational Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This continuum, if made explicit, can serve as a guide to resolving conceptual and theoretical conflicts between subdisciplines, in a manner made impossible under the classical Kuhnian framework of incommensurability. To illustrate, this article draws attention to three of the proposed unifying approaches in the recent special issue of Review of General Psychology : situational realism (Petocz & Mackay, 2013), developmental evolutionary psychology (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2013), and the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) unified theory (Henriques, 2013), which are explored as occupying increasingly “risky” positions along the continuum of practical assumptions. In detailing key threads of compatibility between these examples that may foster enhanced interdisciplinary collaboration and theory building, the authors seek to assist in the gradual emergence of a unified psychology.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Unifying Psychology: Shared Ontology and the Continuum of Practical Assumptions

Marsh

Boag

2014

Review of General Psychology

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Critics have described psychology as a science impaired by disunity. The most recent special issue of Review of General Psychology sought to specifically address this concern, seeking perspectives from a wide range of theorists, each of whom offered their tradition's approach to how psychology as a whole may be integrated into a more unified whole. To continue this discussion, this article draws upon examples from the special issue, the disunity crisis literature, and wider writings in the philosophy of science, to explore the theoretical and conceptual divisions that foster ambiguity, confusion, and apparent irreconcilable differences between the disparate fields of psychology. The authors conclude that the majority of contemporary, scientific psychology is oriented toward a shared physical ontology, which can serve as a common grounding point from which the conceptual and theoretical differences of disparate fields may be meaningfully framed and evaluated. To this end, this article proposes that the various research traditions of psychology can be understood through their positions along a continuum of practical assumptions, which embodies the inherent conflict between two scientific priorities: metaphysical certainty (the safe end of the continuum) and practical experimental predictions (the risky end of the continuum). Three theoretical perspectives offered in the unification special issue are examined under this framework: situational realism (a distinctly safe approach), developmental evolutionary psychology (an intermediate approach), and the Tree of Knowledge unified theory (a relatively risky approach). The authors explore how the recommendations of each approach can be seen as a function of its position on the continuum of practical assumptions, and the implications of this understanding for future integrative efforts is discussed.

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“… 35. For an indication of what such a metaphysics looks like in the context of psychology, see Hibberd (2009) and Petocz and Mackay (2013) and in the context of measurement, Michell (2005). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Representational measurement theory: Is its number up?

Michell

2020

Theory & Psychology

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Representational measurement theory was proposed initially to solve problems caused by disciplinary aspirations of 19th-century mathematicians, who wanted to construe their subject as independent of its applications in empirical science. Half a century later, S. S. Stevens seized the opportunity provided by representational theory’s reconstruction of measurement as numerical coding to rubber-stamp psychology’s own aspirations to be counted as a quantitative science. Patrick Suppes’ version of representational theory rectified defects in Stevens’ theory, making it explicit that representational theory entails that mathematical structure is already embedded in empirical systems. However, Suppes’ theory neglected the fact that attributes, not objects, are the focus of measurement and when that oversight is corrected, it follows that empirical systems sustaining measurement already instantiate positive real numbers. Thus, in measurement, real numbers are estimated, not assigned from without. Representational theory not only misrepresents measurement; it refutes itself.

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Unifying Psychology through Situational Realism

Cited by 16 publications

References 95 publications

From Cronbach to Brunswik: A Conceptual Framework for Personality and Individual Differences Research

From Cronbach to Brunswik: A Conceptual Framework for Personality and Individual Differences Research

Unifying Psychology: Shared Ontology and the Continuum of Practical Assumptions

Representational measurement theory: Is its number up?

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