Unified address translation for memory-mapped SSDs with FlashMap

Huang, Jian; Badam, Anirudh; Qureshi, Moinuddin K.; Schwan, Karsten

doi:10.1145/2872887.2750420

Cited by 9 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(29 reference statements)

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“…Secure Storage Systems. System and architecture community have been working on flash-based storage [17,28,29,59,75], However, most focused on performance rather than security. Similarly, hardware researchers have focused on increasing storage capacity and performance [25,29,42], few of them considered security in their design.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…System and architecture community have been working on flash-based storage [17,28,29,59,75], However, most focused on performance rather than security. Similarly, hardware researchers have focused on increasing storage capacity and performance [25,29,42], few of them considered security in their design. Although we have deployed flash-based storage devices on various computing platforms [32,71], none of the released products claimed they can defend against ransomware attacks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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RSSD: defend against ransomware with hardware-isolated network-storage codesign and post-attack analysis

Reidys

Liu

Huang

2022

Proceedings of the 27th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems

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Encryption ransomware has become a notorious malware. It encrypts user data on storage devices like solid-state drives (SSDs) and demands a ransom to restore data for users. To bypass existing defenses, ransomware would keep evolving and performing new attack models. For instance, we identify and validate three new attacks, including (1) garbage-collection (GC) attack that exploits storage capacity and keeps writing data to trigger GC and force SSDs to release the retained data; (2) timing attack that intentionally slows down the pace of encrypting data and hides its I/O patterns to escape existing defense; (3) trimming attack that utilizes the trim command available in SSDs to physically erase data.To enhance the robustness of SSDs against these attacks, we propose RSSD, a ransomware-aware SSD. It redesigns the flash management of SSDs for enabling the hardware-assisted logging, which can conservatively retain older versions of user data and received storage operations in time order with low overhead. It also employs hardware-isolated NVMe over Ethernet to expand local storage capacity by transparently offloading the logs to remote cloud/servers in a secure manner. RSSD enables post-attack analysis by building a trusted evidence chain of storage operations to assist the investigation of ransomware attacks. We develop RSSD with a real-world SSD FPGA board. Our evaluation shows that RSSD can defend against new and future ransomware attacks, while introducing negligible performance overhead.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

RSSD: defend against ransomware with hardware-isolated network-storage codesign and post-attack analysis

Reidys

Liu

Huang

2022

Proceedings of the 27th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems

Self Cite

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“…Note that the system overhead imposed by MMF (mmap and I/O stack) accounts for 69% of the total execution time. This is because MMF is involved in many software operations including multiple page fault handling, context switches, address translations (i.e., page table, filesystem and FTL), boundary checks, and permission checks [20]. The context switches are one of the main contributors to increase I/O latency [40].…”

Section: B Software-based Memory Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, the queuing mechanism and NVMe communication protocol in I/O stack are optimized for throughput rather than I/O latency [68]. The software operations of MMF consume 15∼20 us [20], which is around 6× longer than ZNAND access latency (3 us).…”

Section: B Software-based Memory Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revamping Storage Class Memory With Hardware Automated Memory-Over-Storage Solution

Zhang,

Kwon,

Gouk

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Large persistent memories such as NVDIMM have been perceived as a disruptive memory technology, because they can maintain the state of a system even after a power failure and allow the system to recover quickly. However, overheads incurred by a heavy software-stack intervention seriously negate the benefits of such memories. First, to significantly reduce the software stack overheads, we propose HAMS, a hardware automated Memory-over-Storage (MoS) solution. Specifically, HAMS aggregates the capacity of NVDIMM and ultra-low latency flash archives (ULL-Flash) into a single large memory space, which can be used as a working memory expansion or persistent memory expansion, in an OS-transparent manner. HAMS resides in the memory controller hub and manages its MoS address pool over conventional DDR and NVMe interfaces; it employs a simple hardware cache to serve all the memory requests from the host MMU after mapping the storage space of ULL-Flash to the memory space of NVDIMM. Second, to make HAMS more energy-efficient and reliable, we propose an "advanced HAMS" which removes unnecessary data transfers between NVDIMM and ULL-Flash after optimizing the datapath and hardware modules of HAMS. This approach unleashes the ULL-Flash and its NVMe controller from the storage box and directly connects the HAMS datapath to NVDIMM over the conventional DDR4 interface. Our evaluations show that HAMS and advanced HAMS can offer 97% and 119% higher system performance than a software-based NVDIMM design, while costing 41% and 45% lower energy, respectively.

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“…The page fault handler obtains a free volatile page from the physical memory manager 5 and maps its physical address to the faulting virtual address referenced by the application using a kernel driver for managing application page table in software [34,41]. In case the free list is empty, PolyEMT evicts a page 6 .…”

Section: Prototyping Polyemtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting more performance with polymorphism from emerging memory technologies

Narayanan

Ganesan

Badam

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the 12th ACM International Conference on Systems and Storage

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Storage-intensive systems in data centers rely heavily on DRAM and SSDs for the performance of reads and persistent writes, respectively. These applications pose a diverse set of requirements, and are limited by ixed capacity, ixed access latency, and ixed function of these resources as either memory or storage. In contrast, emerging memory technologies like 3D-Xpoint, battery-backed DRAM, and ASIC-based fast memory-compression ofer capabilities across several dimensions. However, existing proposals to use such technologies can only improve either read or write performance but not both without requiring extensive changes to the application, and the operating system. We present PolyEMT, a system that employs an emerging memory technology based cache to the SSD, and transparently morphs the capabilities of this cache across several dimensions ś persistence, capacity, latency ś to jointly improve both read and write performance. We demonstrate the beneits of PolyEMT using several largescale storage-intensive workloads from our datacenters. CCS CONCEPTS • Information systems → Storage class memory; Hierarchical storage management; Data compression; • Computer systems organization → Cloud computing; • Software and its engineering → Memory management;

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Unified address translation for memory-mapped SSDs with FlashMap

Cited by 9 publications

References 29 publications

RSSD: defend against ransomware with hardware-isolated network-storage codesign and post-attack analysis

RSSD: defend against ransomware with hardware-isolated network-storage codesign and post-attack analysis

Revamping Storage Class Memory With Hardware Automated Memory-Over-Storage Solution

Getting more performance with polymorphism from emerging memory technologies

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