Understanding Street‐Level Bureaucrats' Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program

Keiser, Lael R.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02131.x

Cited by 239 publications

(232 citation statements)

References 41 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

206

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The relational dimension of MLBs is central, therefore, to explain their performance, as supported by Kuratko, Ireland, Covin et al (2005), communication issues, structural position and interactions, differentiate MLBs from other actors and strategically position them in the decision making process (KEISER, 2010). It is also important to understand how the state operates from the inside, especially in times when there is coexistence among bureaucratic, managerial and governance models in public administration…”

Section: Further Research On Mid-level Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Keiser (2010) also uses the idea of work relationships regulation to support that MLBs -grounded on the interactions they establish -build consensus among a variety of actors to achieve their objectives. Johansson (2012) argues that these agents act as "trading managers", and Bevir and Rhodes (2010), say that they act developing trading methods with different agencies and interests for making effective policies.…”

Section: Further Research On Mid-level Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The mid-level bureaucrats’ performance: determinants of their activities and work relationships

Cavalcante

Lotta

Yamada³

2018

Cad. EBAPE.BR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although scholars have been investigating bureaucrats for a long time, mid-level bureaucrats (MLB) have been far less studied in the literature. To fill this gap, this article explores MLBs heterogeneity regarding their profile, professional background and, above all, performance. The main goal is to investigate the determinants of bureaucrats' performance, depicted by two crucial dimensions: the degree of MLBs relationship within public bureaucracy and complexity level of their activities. These skills are valued today with increasing importance in contexts of network governance and bureaucratic responsiveness. First, a descriptive analysis was undertaken of survey data collected in 2014 from federal mid-level bureaucrats in positions filled by appointment. This was followed by formulating synthetic indexes of two dimensions: bureaucrats' activities and their work relationships. Subsequently, multivariate models were employed to explain the determinants of these dimensions. Empirical results show that the mid-level bureaucrats' performance is both affected by the government's structure factors as well as by their own individual characteristics. However, the variables effects vary considerably. The empirical evidence suggests that MLBs tend to be more connected and perform more activities as they hold higher positions filled by appointment, have a higher level of education and capacity to influence decision processes and work directly with policymaking, especially in social policy.Keywords: Public Administration. Mid-level bureaucracy. Federal Government. Brazil. O desempenho dos burocratas de médio escalão: determinantes do relacionamento e das suas atividades ResumoEmbora os pesquisadores venham estudando a burocracia há bastante tempo, os burocratas de médio escalão (BME) recebem menos atenção da literatura. Para preencher essa lacuna, o artigo explora a questão da heterogeneidade dos BME em relação ao seu perfil, sua experiência profissional e, principalmente, seu desempenho. O principal objetivo é investigar os determinantes do desempenho dos BME a partir de duas dimensões: o nível de relacionamento dos BME e o nível de complexidade de suas atividades. Essas dimensões são muito valorizadas atualmente, considerando o crescimento da sua importância em contextos de governança em rede e accountability burocrática. Primeiro, realizamos uma análise descritiva dos dados coletados em 2014 junto a servidores federais que ocupavam cargos comissionados. Para tanto, elaboramos índices sintéticos das duas dimensões: relacionamento e atividades da burocracia. Posteriormente, empregamos modelos de análise multivariados para explicar seus determinantes. Os resultados empíricos mostram que o desempenho dos burocratas de médio escalão é afetado tanto por fatores estruturais do governo, como também por suas próprias características individuais. No entanto, os efeitos das variáveis mudam consideravelmente. As evidências empíricas sugerem que os BME mais conectados e que realizam mais atividades são aqueles que ocupam c...

show abstract

Section: Further Research On Mid-level Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Further Research On Mid-level Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

The mid-level bureaucrats’ performance: determinants of their activities and work relationships

Cavalcante

Lotta

Yamada³

2018

Cad. EBAPE.BR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moreover, in a series of studies Keiser (1999Keiser ( , 2001Keiser ( , 2010 presents evidence about this principal-agent problem. Her 2001 study shows that state bureaucrats reduce access to the disability federal program when state governments incur costs associated with those programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress.…”

Section: Principal-agent Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Her 2001 study shows that state bureaucrats reduce access to the disability federal program when state governments incur costs associated with those programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress. In a recent survey of DDS examiners, Keiser (2010) finds that examiners who believe that DDS offices should be most accountable to federal taxpayers have lower allowance rates (about 6 percent) than those who believe DDS offices should be most accountable to citizens in their state 1 .…”

Section: Principal-agent Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning

Iyengar

Mastrobuoni

2014

IZA J Labor Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The dramatic rise in the disability insurance (DI) rolls in the last 20 years has been the subject of much controversy. While the relationship between DI and labor force participation has been the subject of a growing literature, the mechanism of this transition from employment to DI remains unclear. We hypothesize that one mechanism is the state-level administration of the program which creates a classic principal-agent problem. We analyze the conflict of interests for Disability Determination Services agencies between Social Security Administration (SSA) standards and state gubernatorial political interests interacted with the increased demand for disability insurance as an alternative for low-skilled employment during the period of 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that multi-term governors allow a greater fraction of applicants than do first-term governors, but only up to year 2000, when allowance rates started to decrease over time. We develop a model that illustrates how these differences can be due to the type of monitoring conducted by the SSA. We provide additional evidence supporting this hypothesis analyzing how the effects interact with economic and political constraints. JEL codes: H55, I18, I38, G22

show abstract

“…Personal interactions between clients and street-level bureaucrats are significant in explaining why street-level bureaucrats behave as they do (Keiser, 2010).…”

Section: Overview Of the Literature On Behavior Bureaucracy And Publimentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucratic Behavior towards Public Management: The Study of Health Services Free in South Sulawesi Province, Indonesia

Ahmad¹,

Erfina²

2017

RES

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Public services in Indonesia in the health sector has not been optimal characterized by complexity of the procedures that experienced, public complaints are still high, and the cost of services is less transparent. The government through bureaucratic reform 2010-2025 Grand Design have established guidelines for the implementation of public services to the world-class public management. The ultimate goal is to improve public services is good and right, improve the quality of policy-making and decision-making, to prevent misuse of authority, and improve resource efficiency. Type of bureaucratic behavior will determine the achievement of bureaucratic reform. Facts and data showing through phenomenology. The data collected with in-depth interviews, observation, and documentation on health services in South Sulawesi indicates that the type of behavior of the bureaucracy in order to realize the reform of the bureaucracy is still in the category of politicians from the four types discussed include the type of employee career, type of politician, professional type, and the type of missionary.

show abstract

Understanding Street‐Level Bureaucrats' Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program

Cited by 239 publications

References 41 publications

The mid-level bureaucrats’ performance: determinants of their activities and work relationships

The mid-level bureaucrats’ performance: determinants of their activities and work relationships

The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning

Bureaucratic Behavior towards Public Management: The Study of Health Services Free in South Sulawesi Province, Indonesia

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About