Understanding Modern Warfare

Jordan, David C.; Kiras, James D.; Lonsdale, David J.; Speller, Ian; Tuck, Christopher; Walton, C. Dale

doi:10.1017/cbo9781316460276

Cited by 25 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Para compreender o desenho de forças terrestres no período da Guerra Fria é necessário adotar a perspectiva metodológica das armas combinadas aplicada ao projeto de força, ou seja, o desenho deliberado da composição de material e pessoal pelo qual se concebem e se preparam forças combatentes (DUPUY, 1990;EVANS, 2003;HOUSE, 2002;JORDAN et al, 2016).…”

Section: Armas Combinadasunclassified

A trajetória das divisões pesadas da URSS e Rússia e dos EUA ao início e ao final da Guerra Fria

Júnior

Costa

Lessa

2021

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Este artigo apresenta e discute o trajeto que levou os desenhos organizacionais das divisões pesadas da URSS e dos EUA ao início e ao final da Guerra Fria. Para tanto, explica as armas combinadas modernas centradas no tanque e o papel central do escalão de comando divisão (10.000-20.000 combatentes) para a disponibilização dos diferentes tipos de tropas necessários para que se possa tê-las quando necessário. Apresenta então os corpos de tanques e mecanizados da URSS, e a divisão blindada dos EUA em 1945, delineando como se chegou às divisões de rifles motorizados e de tanques da URSS e às divisões blindadas e mecanizadas dos EUA tomando c. 1985 como proxy para 1991 em função da turbulência do final da Guerra Fria. A conclusão afirma a continuidade e prevalência do enquadramento de disponibilização de armas combinadas modernas centradas no tanque na divisão como consideração principal no desenho organizacional de forças terrestres até o presente.

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Section: Armas Combinadasunclassified

A trajetória das divisões pesadas da URSS e Rússia e dos EUA ao início e ao final da Guerra Fria

Júnior

Costa

Lessa

2021

TempArg

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“…Writing on naval warfare specifically, Ian Speller argues that, even though naval tactics change over time, there is much continuity at the strategic and operational levels. 72 This suggests that Mahan's work might perhaps still be relevant today.…”

Section: Sea Power As a Theoretical Lensmentioning

confidence: 99%

China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: A quest for sea power

Hlongwa

2020

scim

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Much has been written about China's deep ambitions as the country moves towards great power status. The Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) is just one example of how China is flexing its muscles, and if history is to be believed, there is a strong correlation between maritime success and national economic prosperity. The study, on which this article reports, examined China's MSRI through the lens of sea power theory. It was argued that the New Silk Road, which will most likely be backed by a modern blue-water navy, could represent a new era of maritime supremacy. However, to see the MSRI as a pursuit of sea power requires an understanding of how maritime logistics functions as power. The seamless movement of goods across the ocean is at the heart of the MSRI. Therefore, the research question that was pursued related to how maritime logistics functions as a tool for power projection. Although sea power theory recognises merchant shipping as a core element of sea power, it was further argued that scholarly work in critical logistics and mobility studies could enhance our understanding of logistical power. The study therefore aimed to conceptualise the MSRI through the lens of sea power by highlighting maritime logistics as a strategic conduit for power projection.

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“…Insurgency, as irregular warfare, "is defined as the use of violence by sub-state actors or groups within states for political purposes of achieving power, control and legitimacy, using unorthodox or unconventional approaches to warfare owing to a fundamental weakness in resources or capabilities" (Jordan et al, 2008). Accordingly, insurgents rely on "protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization-all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favor", while avoiding direct engagements (Metz and Millen, 2004).…”

Section: From Asymmetric To "Hybrid"-what Use For Armed Force?mentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s in a name? Re-conceptualizing non-state armed groups in the Middle East

Berti

2016

Palgrave Commun

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In recent decades, the role and status of non-state armed groups (NSAGs)-generally defined as armed organizations operating outside the control of the state and willing and able to use force to achieve their objectives-has attracted growing scholarly and policy interest; mirroring these groups' seemingly more prominent role in both war-making and post-conflict transitions. This is especially the case when it comes to the contemporary Middle East and North Africa, where a combination of state fragility, conflict and instability has further enhanced the military, political and social importance of NSAGs. But is there a mismatch between the organizational evolution of some NSAGs and the conceptual framework adopted to describe and analyze them? How can recognizing these limitations help better conceptualizing and analyzing violent non-state organizations? In the Middle East, organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah operate simultaneously as sophisticated armed organizations, complex political entities and as highly developed social movement organizations involved in administering and delivering social services at the grassroots level. Elsewhere in the region, the rise of the "Islamic State" offers an entirely distinct example of a socio-political project established by an actor commonly defined as a NSAG. Despite the significant ideological, organizational and strategic differences between these organizations, all three actors fall broadly within the "non-state armed groups" category. Yet, both in their use of armed force, as well in their relationship with the state, these organizations appear as characterized by multi-layered identities and strategies that defy simple labelling. Moreover, these groups' different roles as alternative providers of governance de facto blur the line between state and non-state actor and create an evolving dynamic that simultaneously challenges, contests and redefines concepts like statehood and sovereignty. The article analyzes the organizational evolution of these three actors and, in doing so, it problematizes and challenges the way we currently conceptualize and think about non-state actors in general and non-state armed groups more specifically. This article is published as part of a collection on analyzing security complexes in a changing Middle East.

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Understanding Modern Warfare

Cited by 25 publications

References 48 publications

A trajetória das divisões pesadas da URSS e Rússia e dos EUA ao início e ao final da Guerra Fria

A trajetória das divisões pesadas da URSS e Rússia e dos EUA ao início e ao final da Guerra Fria

China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: A quest for sea power

What’s in a name? Re-conceptualizing non-state armed groups in the Middle East

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