2014
DOI: 10.1080/21699763.2014.936024
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Understanding convergence and divergence: old and new cleavages in the politics of minimum income schemes in Italy and Poland

Abstract: Italy and Poland present similarly weak minimum income protection models, yet this results from two different policy trajectories in the last 15 years: both countries actually introduced a minimum income scheme (MIS) between the late 1990s (Italy) and the early 2000s (Poland), but later developments were characterized by policy reversal in the Italian case vis-à-vis institutionalization in Poland. The paper therefore addresses two intertwined puzzles. First, in the light of very different background conditions… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…This claim has been examined thoroughly for several types of welfare state programs, but the available theoretical and empirical underpinning for social assistance is much thinner. In this respect, Jessoula (2014) argues that left-and right-wing preferences might differ from the general proposition.…”
Section: Domestic Politics and Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…This claim has been examined thoroughly for several types of welfare state programs, but the available theoretical and empirical underpinning for social assistance is much thinner. In this respect, Jessoula (2014) argues that left-and right-wing preferences might differ from the general proposition.…”
Section: Domestic Politics and Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 91%
“…Also, the Catholic Church may have good reasons to oppose strong anti‐poverty policies and social services, because the latter may displace the role of confessional associations in the field (Natili, ). As regards political parties, both social services and public safety nets have a “modernist flavor” and may constitute a challenge to established familialistic model, thus prompting the firm opposition of parties representing the Catholic right, traditionally important in Southern Europe (Jessoula, Kubisa, Madama, & Zielenska, ; Flaquer, ). Finally, also the political support of left parties is not obvious in Southern Europe, because family policies (and in particular monetary benefits) were traditionally perceived as conservative concerns (see Naldini & Saraceno, ), also a legacy of the pro‐natalist agenda pursued by past authoritarian political regimes in all four countries.…”
Section: Old Age Bias and Intergenerational Recalibration In Southernmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…European inputs were less successful in the Italian case, because the domestic political dynamics were less favorable. The timid efforts to introduce novelties by center‐left governments—not always sustained by the largely pro‐insider agenda of the trade unions—were followed by policy reversal and restoration of the traditional welfare model by conservative governments (Natili, ; Jessoula et al, ). In the Italian case therefore, prior to the Great Recession, the scant interest of social actors and the presence of a center‐right coalition supportive of the traditional welfare configuration impeded greater investment in these underdeveloped policy fields.…”
Section: The Pre‐crises Trajectories Of Welfare Reforms In Italy and mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, it was the last EU‐28 country introducing a last‐resort safety net for working‐age individuals in the form a fully‐fledged minimum income scheme (MIS) in 2018, whereas in the previous seven decades (1946–2017) a national anti‐poverty programme had always lacked – despite the high level of overall social protection expenditure. Second, the “Italian exceptionalism” relates to the peculiar policy trajectory leading to such policy outcome: in fact, the long lasting absence of MIS in the Italian welfare state was due to neither political inertia nor institutional resilience, but rather the result of an inconsistent policy trajectory, with several attempts of path departure soon followed by policy reversals – both at the national and the regional level (Jessoula, Kubisa, Madama, & Zielenska, 2014; Natili, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%