Uncoordinated Load Balancing and Congestion Games in P2P Systems

Suri, Subhash; Tóth, Csaba D.; Zhou, Yunhong

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30183-7_12

Cited by 22 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Such uncoordinated strategies have been studied from a game-theoretic perspective by Suri, Tóth, and Zhou [23], where clients placing resources on servers are assumed to engage in selfish, strategic behavior. Their results are not directly applicable to systems that have to preserve ordering, but their work suggests interesting possibilities for further analysis of our algorithms and others from a game-theoretic perspective (which we defer to future work).…”

Section: Game-theoretic Issues For Load-balancing Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Load balancing and locality in range-queriable data structures

Aspnes

Kirsch

2004

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

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We describe a load-balancing mechanism for assigning elements to servers in a distributed data structure that supports range queries. The mechanism ensures both load-balancing with respect to an arbitrary load measure specified by the user and geographical locality, assigning elements with similar keys to the same server. Though our mechanism is specifically designed to improve the performance of skip graphs, it can be adapted to provide deterministic, locality-preserving load-balancing to any distributed data structure that orders machines in a ring or line.

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Section: Game-theoretic Issues For Load-balancing Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Load balancing and locality in range-queriable data structures

Aspnes

Kirsch

2004

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

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“…They can choose one of two links and the minimal throughput is guaranteed only if one agent uses that link alone. This is often the case when downloading data in P2P systems (see, e.g., Suri et al (2005)). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

Renault¹,

Scarlatti²,

Scarsini³

2008

Mathematical Social Sciences

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We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. (2005), who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs Hausdorff-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.

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“…They can choose one of two links, and the minimal throughput is guaranteed only if one of the agents uses that link alone. This is often the case when downloading data in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (see, e.g., Suri et al [35]). …”

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confidence: 99%

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall

2007

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This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.

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Uncoordinated Load Balancing and Congestion Games in P2P Systems

Abstract: In P2P systems, users

Cited by 22 publications

References 10 publications

Load balancing and locality in range-queriable data structures

Load balancing and locality in range-queriable data structures

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall

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