Uncertainty Perpetuated? The Pitfalls of a Weakly Institutionalized Party System in Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

The parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in October 2015 garnered widespread approval from commentators for the level of fairness and freedom maintained throughout the campaign. However, the results of the vote do not provide a clear indication of the current state of affairs of parliamentarism in the republic. Focusing on the commercialization of party lists, we argue that neither identity politics nor the logic of neopatrimonialism adequately explain the dynamics of political competition in Kyrgyzstan. Instead, we see perpetual uncertainty emerging from contradicting yet increasing attempts to harness the capital of privatized party lists and to impose discipline. Eventually, and beyond short-term threats of an emerging super-presidentialism, Kyrgyzstan risks suffering from hollow parliamentarism, with political parties persistently failing to supply legislative initiatives with substantial agendas and adequate professionals. The weakly institutionalized political parties and their short-sighted electoral strategies undermine both the parliamentary system and its political pluralism.

On the causes of electoral volatility in Asia since 1948

“…A baseline category is no authoritarian legacy. performance of former non-British colonies, such as East Timor and Indonesia (Aspinall et al, 2018;Ufen, 2008), and the struggles of those with no colonial legacy, such as Kyrgyzstan (Doolotkeldieva and Wolters, 2017), in our pool of the countries of the most recent transition. In sum, we find that electoral volatility is indeed lower in former British colonies than in other colonies as hypothesized in H2b, which, however, is conditional on the timing of transition and valid among all except those most recently democratized.…”

Kyrgyzstan's Poison Parliament

“…With no ideational bonds or shared policy agendas to keep parties together, internal rebellions and formal splits constantly erupted within parliamentary factions. 13 Indeed, after having successfully campaigned and secured votes in their home regions, candidates felt that parties owed them rather than the other way around. 14 MPs seeking reelection would use their past records of attracting voters as bargaining chips to obtain more favorable positions on party lists.…”