Kyrgyzstan's Poison Parliament

Abstract

Since Kyrgyzstan declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country has been an outlier in Central Asia. Unlike its authoritarian neighbors-Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan quickly developed a more open and pluralistic political system. Over the past three decades, the country has swung between democracy and authoritarianism, never decisively choosing one over the other. While the coexistence of democratic and authoritarian elements has hindered the country's establishment of a truly democratic political system, it has also provided checks against full-fledged authoritarian rule.Kyrgyzstan's citizens have mobilized against and overthrown no fewer than three presidents since 2005, each of whom had led an increasingly authoritarian and corrupt government. The 2005 popular uprising known as the "Tulip Revolution" brought down the country's first president, Askar Akayev-whose democratic credentials had diminished considerably during his fifteen years in power. 1 His successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, dashed hopes for a more democratic Kyrgyzstan by establishing an autocratic system even harsher than Akayev's. Bakiyev was then forced out after just five years when angry crowds staged a revolt in April 2010. 2 Prodemocratic reforms passed in the wake of those protests did not stop demonstrators from storming the seat of parliament in October 2020, culminating in the resignation of President Sooronbay Jeenbekov halfway through his six-year term. How did Kyrgyzstan get here?After Bakiyev, the new political leadership pursued significant institutional reform to limit the presidency's powers and empower parlia-

Corruption, Elite Contestation, and Parliaments: Why Do Legislatures Become Stronger in Authoritarian Regimes?

“…Through engaging in (far-reaching) corruption, authoritarian elites can build up networks of support and influence. They can share public resources with their supporters and thus, manifest their power base (e.g., Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Engvall 2022). Closely related to clientelism, these networks and exchanges help legislators to become important actors in their own right (e.g., Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Sigman and Lindberg 2019).…”