Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace

Abstract

Variable selection is a crucial aspect of formulating a model to empirically examine data, as omitted variables can create spurious association, while inclusion of irrelevant variables can bias the results of one’s estimates. To mitigate such problems, researchers rely on theory to guide their selection of variables to include in their models. Unfortunately, in social science, there often exist several plausible theories to explain actions, and hence several models that researchers can use in their empirical work. This lack of unique theory is evident in examining trade’s effect on conflict, as there are three main theories on this and each suggests a different effect for trade interdependence on conflict. Empirically, the effect of trade on conflict remains uncertain, as researchers Barbieri and Oneal & Russett have come to disparate conclusions using different measures of trade interdependence (models). Each of their inferences is based on the belief that the variables they select form the ‘true’ model that generates the data. The problem is that theory is unable to indicate whether one model is more appropriate than another, which creates uncertainty over the empirical effects of trade on conflict. To account for uncertainty in model selection, the author allows for several models by applying Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to the study of conflict. Accounting for this uncertainty, he finds that trade interdependence does not have a significant effect on the prediction of militarized conflict, whereas joint democracy continues to reduce conflict.

Economic War and Democratic Peace

“…This notion of a democratic peace holds that norms and institutions of democratic regimes, when paired with other democratic regimes, form shared values of friendship and compromise, which promote nonviolent interactions. Support for this idea is based on the historical absence of wars between democratic countries (Babst, 1972;Small & Singer, 1976) and the results of numerous empirical studies (Goenner, 2004;Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996;Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999a) that find democratic pairs of states are less likely to engage in militarized disputes than are other pairs. This has led some (Levy, 1988) to describe the empirical version of the proposition as the closest thing in international relations to a law.…”

The End of the Eternal Return of “Econophoria” in Northeast Asia?: On the Use and Abuse of the Economic Concept of Peace

“…(d) Indeed perhaps the correlation of economic interdependence and peace is causally spurious, subject to confounding variables. To take just one example, one might argue that the famed "democratic peace" (a concept related to, but analytically distinct from, economic interdependence) is the actual cause for pacific inter-state relations (Levy 1988;Goenner 2004;Kim and Rousseau 2005;Levy 2010). At the very least there is a methodological problem: it is difficult for IR models to disambiguate economic interdependence and tradebased economic development from democracy development (and therefore from democratic peace) precisely because so frequently the two arise concomitantly.…”

Mission accomplished: A reply to Reuveny and Keshk

“…Reuveny and Keshk (2013) further question the choice of exogenous variables used in Goenner's (2011) specifications. Theory should guide the choice of variables, yet as Goenner (2004) has previously made clear, theory does not always suggest how to measure variables of theoretical interest. The variables used by Goenner (2011) are those typical to most studies of trade and conflict.…”