Economic War and Democratic Peace

Abstract

Research has shown that democracies rarely, if ever, engage each other in war and are less likely to have militarized disputes than when interacting with authoritarian regimes. Economic sanctions are an alternative to militarized conflict viewed by the masses as more acceptable. The conflict-inhibiting effects of democratic norms and institutions are thus weakened with respect to the use of sanctions. This paper examines whether a country's decision to initiate sanctions is influenced by its regime type as well as that of the potential target. The results for the period 1950 to 1990 indicate that the more democratic a country is, the more likely it is to initiate sanctions. Democracies, however, are less likely to target other democratic regimes relative to nondemocratic regimes. With respect to sanctions use, pairs of democracies are not peaceful.

Economic Sanctions and Culture

“…The same factors that encourage peace among democracies -a greater ability to send clear signals of resolve and a greater dependence of democratic politicians on successful policies -are expected to operate in the realm of sanctions (Lektzian and Souva, 2003: 647). Lektzian and Souva's (2003), Cox and Drury's (2006) and Goenner's (2007) results all show that democracies impose sanctions more often than other regime types. Lektzian and Souva (2003: 644-645) hypothesize that this propensity to sanction is due to the fact that the ruling coalitions in democracies encompass a greater variety of interest groups that need to be satisfied.…”

“…12 A further argument is that accountability of democratic politicians to large constituencies gives them a greater incentive to conduct successful foreign policies and protect their citizens from the costs of war (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 9 See Nooruddin (2002), Lektzian and Souva (2003), Cox and Drury (2006), Goenner (2007) and Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008), whose contributions are discussed further in Section 2.…”

“…At the same time, however, Lektzian and Souva (2003), Cox and Drury (2006) and Goenner (2007) also find that democracies are more likely to sanction non-democracies than other democracies. 18 Cox and Drury suggest that this result occurs because two of the most common reasons that democracies impose sanctions -to promote democracy and to punish human rights violations -apply largely to autocratic targets; democratic states, by definition, are usually not the ones guilty of abusing their citizens' political or human rights.…”

“…15 Nevertheless, it has clearly been influential in the sanctions literature. Thus, Lektzian and Souva (2003), Cox and Drury (2006) and Goenner (2007) investigate whether there is an analogous 'economic peace' between democracies, i.e. whether democracies are relatively unlikely to use economic sanctions against other democracies.…”

“…17 Goenner (2007) maintains that, precisely because the public views sanctions as more acceptable than militarized conflict, the usual conflict-inhibiting effects of democratic norms and institutions are weakened when it comes to the use of sanctions.…”