This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a …rm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a …rm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal …rms' characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all …rms innovate, some …rms innovate and others imitate, or no …rm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We …nd that the e¢ ciency of intellectual property rights protection positively a¤ects …rms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative e¤ect. In addition, smaller …rms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German …rms from manufacturing and services sectors.Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous e¤ect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account speci…c market and …rm characteristics.Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31.