2017
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2017.1297108
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UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment

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Cited by 12 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Over the past 70 years peacekeeping has developed at the level of precedents, which were marked in the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions (mandates), and adopted following a unanimous decision by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Gardell and Verbeek, 2021). At the same time, the research discourse has looked at issues such as the provision of mandates to combat terrorism and violent extremism (Kalyadin, 2016), problems and prospects for the development of partnerships between the UN and regional actors in matters of peacekeeping (Bara and Hultman, 2020), use of knowledge-intensive dual-use technologies in the activities of peacekeeping missions (Andrews, 2017), intelligence in peacekeeping (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017), and issues of logistics and funding (Coleman, 2017).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Over the past 70 years peacekeeping has developed at the level of precedents, which were marked in the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions (mandates), and adopted following a unanimous decision by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Gardell and Verbeek, 2021). At the same time, the research discourse has looked at issues such as the provision of mandates to combat terrorism and violent extremism (Kalyadin, 2016), problems and prospects for the development of partnerships between the UN and regional actors in matters of peacekeeping (Bara and Hultman, 2020), use of knowledge-intensive dual-use technologies in the activities of peacekeeping missions (Andrews, 2017), intelligence in peacekeeping (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017), and issues of logistics and funding (Coleman, 2017).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These units possessed sophisticated technological systems and had intelligence professionals that were trained according to NATO regulations. Despite this, however, many of ASIFU’s soldiers lacked awareness of the complexity of the conflict, the history of Mali and ethnic sensitivities (see, for example, Rietjens and de Waard, 2017). They also hardly mastered French or Arabic, let alone the local Malian languages that were spoken.…”
Section: Ambiguity and Meaning Making In The Un Mission In Malimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From 2014 and 2017, MINUSMA’s Force Commander and his sector chiefs realized that they lacked adequate current intelligence on crucial safety and security issues such as the threat along MINUSMA’s main supply routes and the whereabouts of armed groups. According to many of the respondents, this was largely due to the ineffectiveness of the regular UN intelligence capabilities (see also Rietjens and de Waard, 2017). To improve the situation, the Force Commander asked ASIFU to fill this gap, although ASIFU’s original task was to provide comprehensive intelligence in the mid- and long terms.…”
Section: Empirical Illustrations Of Meaning-making Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Meanwhile, the nation-building mission of MINUSMA also implied a strong need for medium to long-term intelligence on macro-level societal developments. From missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN had learned that a (traditional) security-oriented intelligence chain is not sufficient in the context of nation-building (Rietjens and De Waard 2017). That is, knowledge on macro-level societal developments was needed to develop a broader societal awareness.…”
Section: Near Decomposabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%