Ultimatum Game With Asymmetric Information: A Study of Deception and Fairness

Abstract

The task of the experiment reported here is to examine decision making in ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmetric information. In the asymmetric information condition, subjects (n = 13 4) were given an opportunity to deceive their playing partner. I found that participants indeed deceived their partners, specifically: While subjects were given on average 108.06 (probabilistic) CZK (Czech Koruna) to divide among themselves and their partner, in the asymmetric condition they reported to their pa rtner tha t they were given 59.0 5 CZK only. Subsequently, they allocated only 30.19 CZK to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game, whereas in the symmetric information game, where deception was not possible, they allocated 48.65 CZK. The larger the surplus to be divided, the more deception was present. Women deceived significantly more than men and allocated less money to their partner in the asymmetric information ultimatum game (the effect size of gender was small, though).

Looking Like a Million Dollars: Does Attractiveness Priming Increase Altruistic Behavior in Experimental Games?

“…Offers of 20% or lower are more often rejected than those which are not, and offers of 30% also tend to be frequently rejected (e.g., Camerer, 2003 ; Engel, 2011 ; Tisserand et al, 2015 ). Our subject pool seems moderately more generous than the average, but well within the norm, and roughly conformed to previous findings in the same cultural setting (Lindová et al, 2010 ; Novakova and Flegr, 2013 ; Veselý, 2014 ).…”

“…Offers of 20% or lower are more often rejected than those which are not, and offers of 30% also tend to be frequently rejected (e.g., Camerer, 2003;Engel, 2011;Tisserand et al, 2015). Our subject pool seems moderately more generous than the average, but well within the norm, and roughly conformed to previous findings in the same cultural setting (Lindová et al, 2010;Novakova and Flegr, 2013;Veselý, 2014). We found no effect of attractiveness priming on DG allocations or responses to UG offers, but it had the expected effect on UG offers made by men and the opposite effect on offers made by women.…”

Mentalizing During Social Interaction: The Development and Validation of the Interactive Mentalizing Questionnaire

“…Our task was based on a UG task with asymmetric information ( Vesely, 2014 ), previously used to examine self-interest driven dishonesty. In this version, only the proposer knows the initial endowment, and has an opportunity to tell the responder how much this amount is.…”

Explaining Differences in Men and Women's Use of Unethical Tactics in Negotiations

“…Although Lewicki and colleagues (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998;Robinson et al, 2000) and various others (e.g., Ma & Parks, 2012;Perry & Nixon, 2005) found men registering higher scores on their self-reported inappropriate negotiation strategies (SINS) scale, the record in behavioral economics is somewhat mixed. Some economists have reported men lying to, cheating, and stealing more from their counterparts than women (e.g., Dreber & Johannesson, 2008;Erat & Gneezy, 2012;Friesen & Gangadharan, 2012), whereas others have found no differences (e.g., Childs, 2012) or even the opposite (e.g., Vesely, 2014). Consequently, negotiation researchers have begun to investigate why and when men show more willingness to use unethical negotiation tactics than women (Kennedy et al, 2017;Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012;Lee et al, 2017).…”