Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences

Abstract

In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side’s preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market. (JEL C78, I23, J41, J44)

Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*

“…Second, preferences for refugee families are based only on mutual acceptability. This type of preference structure on two‐sided matching markets was recently studied by Haeringer and Iehlé (). They demonstrated, using data from the junior academic job market for French mathematicians, that the mutual acceptability assumption on one side of the market (in this case, the refugee side) can be made almost without loss of generality whenever interest is directed towards stable matchings.…”

Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application

“…First, given the assumption that one side of the market can form preferences over agents on the other side of the market, preferences can be induced based on the concept of mutual acceptability. Such preferences has recently been theoretically studied by Haeringer and Iehlé (2017) and in a refugee assignment context by Andersson and Ehlers (2016). Second, preferences can be estimated based on econometric techniques.…”