Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application

Abstract

This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.

Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing

“…By considering a real-world resource allocation problem, we contribute to the study of formal properties of specific allocation processes in the field and the study of alternative mechanisms. Studies in this vein include those on entry-level labor markets (Roth, 1984;Roth and Peranson, 1999), school choice (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999;Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003;Sönmez, 2008, 2013a), spectrum auctions (Milgrom, 2000), kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2004, 2005, internet auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007;Varian, 2007), course allocation (Sönmez andÜnver, 2010;Budish, 2011), cadet-branch matching (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013;Sönmez, 2013), assignment of airport arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra, 2013;Schummer and Abizada, 2017), and refugee resettlement (Jones and Teytelboym, 2017;Delacrétaz, Kominers and Teytelboym, 2016;Andersson, 2017).…”

Triage Protocol Design for Ventilator Rationing in a Pandemic: Integrating Multiple Ethical Values through Reserves

“…By considering a real-world resource allocation problem, we contribute to the study of formal properties of specific allocation processes in the field and the study of alternative mechanisms. Studies in this vein include those on entry-level labor markets (Roth, 1984;Roth and Peranson, 1999), school choice (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999;Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003;Sönmez, 2008, 2013a), spectrum auctions (Milgrom, 2000), kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez andÜnver, 2004, 2005, internet auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007;Varian, 2007), course allocation (Sönmez andÜnver, 2010;Budish, 2011), cadet-branch matching (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013;Sönmez, 2013), assignment of airport arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra, 2013;Schummer and Abizada, 2017), and refugee resettlement (Jones and Teytelboym, 2017;Delacrétaz, Kominers and Teytelboym, 2016;Andersson, 2017).…”

Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing

“…By considering a real-world resource allocation problem, we contribute to the study of formal properties of specific allocation processes in the field and the study of alternative mechanisms. Studies in this vein include those on entry-level labor markets (Roth, 1984;Roth and Peranson, 1999), school choice (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999;Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003), spectrum auctions (Milgrom, 2000), kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez and Ünver, 2004), internet auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007;Varian, 2007), course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver, 2010;Budish, 2011), cadet-branch matching (Sönmez and Switzer, 2013;Sönmez, 2013), assignment of airport arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra, 2013;Schummer and Abizada, 2017), and refugee resettlement (Jones and Teytelboym, 2017;Delacrétaz, Kominers and Teytelboym, 2019;Andersson, 2019).…”