Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

I argue that Kant's distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions, namely Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism, all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically intuitions, do not require synthesis. I argue that there are deep reasons for thinking that Intellectualism is incompatible with Kant's view as expressed in the Transcendental Aesthetic. We can better see how Kant's arguments in the first Critique may be integrated, I suggest, by examining his notion of the "unity" (Einheit) of a representation. I articulate two distinct ways in which a representation may possess unity and claim that we can use these notions to integrate Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction without compromising the core claims of either Sensibilism or Intellectualism-that intuition is a form of objective representation independent of synthesis, and that the kind of objective representations that ground scientific knowledge of the world require synthesis by the categories.

Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy

“…But it does include an account of the relation between mind and matter, as set out most centrally in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Kant's account rests on his transcendental idealist distinction 9 See (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005, McLear 2011, 2015 for instances of these arguments in support of nonconceptualism; see (Gomes 2014, Griffith 2012) on the arguments against. (McLear 2014) provides a helpful overview of the debate.…”

Kant's Conceptualism: a New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction

“…In the former, the parts are prior to the wholes, and the wholes are aggregates of the parts. In the latter, the wholes are prior, and the parts are limitations of the wholes (McLear, , pp. 87–88).…”

“…Non‐conceptualist interpreters, including Lucy Allais () and Colin McLear (), raise incisive objections to these conceptualist interpretations. They argue that these interpretations render Kant's Deduction incompatible with his Aesthetic, specifically, the latter Metaphysical Expositions .…”

Kant on Animal Minds

“…unlike naragon (1990), mcLear (2011), and Hoffmann (2012, I maintain that Kant is terminologically consistent and sincere in his denial of consciousness to animals, since Kant uses consciousness [Bewusstsein] to mean unified consciousness. Like mcLear (2011;2015), I argue that the mental life of animals is disunified.…”

“…they have sensibility (Anth 7:196), but experience (in Kant's technical sense) is impossible for non-rational animals, since the understanding 2. See naragon (1990( ), mcLear (20112015), and Hoffmann (2012). I concur with naragon's treatment in most of what follows, but differ on the issue of animal consciousness.…”