Kant on Animal Minds

Fisher, Naomi

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.015

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…See similarly McLear (2011). For more on animal consciousness, see Fisher (2017) and Indregard (2018: §9.3).…”

Section: Animal Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense

Liang¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant's doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I argue that this deadlock can be traced back to an inadequate understanding of inner sense shared by both sides. Drawing upon an analysis of the notion of obscure representations, I offer an alternative interpretation of inner sense with a special regard to self-affection, apprehension, and attention. From this basis, I will infer that outer sense delivers sensory content that is initially and intrinsically unaccompanied by phenomenal consciousness; inner sense contributes by endowing such content with phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, phenomenal qualities can be regarded as the sensory manifold of inner sense. This alternative interpretation solves the longstanding dispute concerning inner sensations and would further illuminate Kant's notion of inner experience.

show abstract

“…See similarly McLear (2011). For more on animal consciousness, see Fisher (2017) and Indregard (2018: §9.3).…”

Section: Animal Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense

Liang¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…modified. On the significance of this letter see Fisher (2017) and Villinger (2018, 121ff.). In a related discussion in one of his Lectures on Metaphysics , Kant (1997, 28:276) denies that we can think of animals as having inner sense at all.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant

Khurana

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper argues that Kant'sdistinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant'saccount interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.

show abstract

“…Kant's views on animals have received increasing amounts of attention in recent times (McLear 2011;Fisher 2017). The reason why his views on animals are much discussed is the debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant (see Hanna 2017 for an overview of the debate).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…McLear's position has recently been criticized by Fisher (2017). Fisher argues that according to Kant all representations of animals are obscure, i.e., they are representations of which they are not conscious (Fisher 2017, p. 444).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%