Two Forms of Exclusion Mean Two Different Negations

Abstract

Para o meu professor Luiz Carlos PereiraHere, the logical behaviour of negation in Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1918) is compared with Demos' account of denial (1917). Even if we hold negation as a pure syntactical device, at least in some context, it brings a handful of complex semantic information -potentially an infinite amount (e.g., in the ascription of degrees to empirical qualities or of colours to visual points). We advocate then the existence of at least two negations due to the existence of two different and non-reducible types of exclusion. The first negation is a Tractarian and classical one, based on the notion of contradiction, whereas the second is a non-classical negation, based on the notion of contrariety.

Sobre a fragmentação do espaço lógico tractariano

“…Se algo parecesse de fato contradizer a imagem de lógica tractariana, isto teria que ser um sinal inequívoco que cometemos algum erro na análise ou que a análise não foi, então, feita até o fim. Ainda haveria complexidade lógica a ser sublimada em termos de proposições elementares logicamente independentes (SILVA 2016a(SILVA , 2016b.…”