Two Faces of Responsibility

Watson, Gary

doi:10.5840/philtopics199624222

Cited by 421 publications

(207 citation statements)

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“…5 For general discussions of the concept of responsibility, see Eshleman (2004), Hart (1968), and Williams (2006). 6 The classic reference is Watson (1996); cf. also Weber (1921), on a person's availability to answer for the foreseeable consequences of her actions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility: One Size Does Not Fit All. Collecting Evidence from Europe

2009

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ABSTRACT. This article serves as an introduction to the collection of papers in this monographic issue on ''What the European tradition can teach about Corporate Social Responsibility'' and presents the rationale and the main hypotheses of the project. We maintain that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an ethical concept, that the demands for socially responsible actions have been around since before the Industrial Revolution and that companies have responded to them, especially in Europe, and that the content of CSR has evolved over time, depending on historical, cultural, political, and socio-economic drivers and particular conditions in different countries and also at different points in time. Therefore, there is not -and probably cannot be -a unique, precise definition of CSR: one global standard for CSR is unlikely.

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confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility: One Size Does Not Fit All. Collecting Evidence from Europe

2009

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“…Shomaker's argument and usage of the distinction between attributability and accountability may seem a bit strange; even though a person could not feel empathy for others, his actions could still be attributed to him if they express his identity and what he stands for (Watson 1996). But on the other hand, it does make sense to argue that the inability to feel empathy is morally relevant.…”

Section: Badness As Madness?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Disability and Moral Responsibility

Vehmas¹

2011

Trames

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Abstract. This article offers an introductory analysis of the philosophical and empirical considerations having to do with the significance of psychopathy, intellectual disability and ADHD regarding one's moral responsibility. Moral responsibility comes in degrees and is ultimately determined on social grounds. Whether a certain diagnosis and its underpinning neuro-cognitive impairment affects one's cognitive, emotional and moral conduct, depends also on social and relational factors.

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“…The fifth to 10th sections concentrate on the compatibilist alternative-its classical form and classical difficulties, the influential Frankfurt account, and two lines of compatibilist thought that appear promising for further work. One of these is an emphasis on normativity, clear in a range of current work (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998;Wallace, 1994;Watson, 1996;Wolf, 1990). The other, which focuses on the crucial contextuality of attributions of free will, has been developed only recently.…”

Section: The Dilemma Of Determinismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of those pursuing a normative compatibilism take Peter Strawson (1962) as a precursor (Wallace, 1994;Watson, 1996;Wolf, 1990). Strawson emphasizes the role of ''reactive attitudes'' in our ascription of moral responsibility.…”

Section: Reasons and Causes: The Normativity Of Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

Free will in context: a contemporary philosophical perspective

Grim

2007

Behavioral Sci & The Law

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Philosophical work on free will is inevitably framed by the problem of free will and determinism. This paper offers an overview of the current state of the philosophical art. Early sections focus on quantum indeterminism, an outline of the most influential logical argument for incompatibilism between free will and determinism, and telling problems that face incompatibilism. A major portion of the paper focuses on the compatiblist alternative, favored by many working philosophers. The conditional account of free will offered by classical compatibilism can be shown to be inadequate. A number of compatibilist options remain open, however, and seem promising for future research. These include 'hierarchical' or 'mesh' accounts of free will, normative perspectives and an approach to free will in terms of an emphasis on context. Final sections draw out the implications of contemporary compatibilism for the brain and behavioral sciences and for the law.

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Two Faces of Responsibility

Cited by 421 publications

References 0 publications

Corporate Social Responsibility: One Size Does Not Fit All. Collecting Evidence from Europe

Corporate Social Responsibility: One Size Does Not Fit All. Collecting Evidence from Europe

Disability and Moral Responsibility

Free will in context: a contemporary philosophical perspective

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