Two-Faced Morality: Distrust Promotes Divergent Moral Standards for the Self Versus Others

Abstract

People do not trust hypocrites, because they preach water, but drink wine. The current research shows that, ironically, when we distrust, we become moral hypocrites ourselves. We argue that experiencing distrust alerts us to the possibility that others may intent to exploit us, and that such looming exploitation differentially affects moral standards for the self versus others. Four studies ( N = 1,225) examined this possibility and its underlying motivational dynamic. Study 1 established a relationship between dispositional distrust and flexible, self-serving moral cognition. In Studies 2 and 3, participants experiencing distrust (vs. trust) endorsed more lenient moral standards for themselves than for others. Study 4 explored the role of the motivation to avoid exploitation in these effects. Specifically, participants' dispositional victim sensitivity moderated the effect of distrust on hypocrisy. Together, these findings suggest that individuals who distrust and fear to be exploited show self-serving, and hence untrustworthy, moral cognition themselves.

Perceiving a Lack of Social Justice: Lower Class Individuals Apply Higher Moral Standards to Others

“…Social class, defined by people’s objective material resources or subjective perceptions of their relative rank in society (Kraus et al, 2012), is closely related to moral judgment and behavior (e.g., Côté et al, 2013; Piff et al, 2012). Having double moral standards is a phenomenon with central importance in the research on morality (Monin & Merritt, 2012) and refers to the endorsement of inconsistent moral standards for oneself and for others (Graham et al, 2015), including criticizing others’ moral transgressions more than the same transgressions conducted by oneself and requiring others to behave more morally than one does in the same context (Batson et al, 1997; Lammers et al, 2010; Weiss et al, 2018).…”

“…Having double standards is morally biased because the same principle is not applied to all people; thus, it is important to understand its causes. Despite existing research linking it with personal feelings (e.g., feeling powerful, angry, or distrusting; Lammers et al, 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Weiss et al, 2018) and thinking style (e.g., abstract thinking; Lammers, 2012), little attention has been paid to whether certain social factors, such as one’s perceived position in the social hierarchy, would lead to inconsistent moral judgments toward the self and others. The current research aims to extend this line of research by testing the association between subjective social class and double moral standards.…”

“…The perception of injustice may further lead to double moral standards. Existing research has demonstrated that distrust and dispositional victim sensitivity interact to influence double moral standards (Weiss et al, 2018). Specifically, when people distrust, whether due to disposition or priming, they become more concerned about the possibility of being exploited, thus endorsing harsher moral standards for others than for themselves; further, such an effect is more prominent for people higher in dispositional victim sensitivity (Weiss et al, 2018).…”

“…Existing research has demonstrated that distrust and dispositional victim sensitivity interact to influence double moral standards (Weiss et al, 2018). Specifically, when people distrust, whether due to disposition or priming, they become more concerned about the possibility of being exploited, thus endorsing harsher moral standards for others than for themselves; further, such an effect is more prominent for people higher in dispositional victim sensitivity (Weiss et al, 2018). Anger, an emotional response to perceived injustice (Scott et al, 2013) that can elicit distrust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), also makes people require others to behave more morally, such as making a larger donation compared to their own behavior in an identical situation (Polman & Ruttan, 2012).…”

Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions

“…Finally, prior work has related interindividual differences to moral judgment (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011;Burgmer et al, 2019;Byrd & Conway, 2019;Conway et al, 2018;Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013;Inbar et al, 2009;Koenigs et al, 2014;Koerner et al, 2020;Miller et al, 2014;Weiss et al, 2018). Much of this work, however, has focused on "classic" moral dilemma decisions and individual differences in affective reactions to them.…”